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Big Censorship in the Big House— 
A Quarter-Century After Turner v. Safley: 
Muting Movies, Music & Books Behind Bars 
Clay Calvert* 
 
Kara Carnley Murrhee† 
ABSTRACT 
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Turner v. Safley, this Article examines how federal courts across the country are 
applying the Turner standard today in cases involving the First Amendment free speech 
rights of inmates. Are courts too quick today to support the censorial proclivities of 
prison officials? Do judges too readily capitulate in deference to the concerns of those 
tasked with overseeing the incarcerated? Those are the key questions this Article 
addresses by analyzing inmate access to magazines, movies, books, and other common 
forms of media artifacts. This Article’s determinations stem from opinions rendered in 
2010 and 2011 at both the federal appellate and district court levels. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court is currently busy analyzing First Amendment1 
cases affecting individuals’ access to supposedly harmful or otherwise offensive media 
content. For instance, in June 2011, the Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari2 to 
consider whether the Federal Communications Commission’s “current indecency-
                                                
* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the Marion B. Brechner 
First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.; B.A., 1987, Communication, 
Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; 
Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University; Member, State Bar of California. The authors thank 
Justin Hayes, Rebekah Rich, and Michael Russo of the University of Florida for editing drafts of this 
Article. 
† B.S., 2006, Mass Communication, University of Central Florida; M.A., 2010, Mass Communication, 
University of Florida; J.D./Ph.D. candidate, University of Florida.. 
1 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech 
and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
2 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 613 F.3d 317 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 3065 (2011) 
(No. 10-1293). 
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enforcement regime violates the First or Fifth Amendment3 to the United States 
Constitution.”4 The same day it chose to hear the dispute over broadcast indecency,5 the 
Supreme Court struck down a California law limiting minors’ access to violent video 
games,6 ruling that the state failed to prove the law satisfied the rigorous strict scrutiny7 
standard of judicial review.8 Previously, in United States v. Stevens,9 the high court 
declared unconstitutional on overbreadth10 grounds a federal statute11 criminalizing “the 
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty.”12 
While such high-profile battles are waged before the Supreme Court,13 dozens of 
First Amendment fights involving the ability of inmates to access media content like 
                                                
3 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011). 
5 The FCC defines indecent content as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory organs or activities.” Guide: Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/obscenity-indecency-and-profanity (last visited May 8, 2012). 
6 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); see CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746 (2010) (defining the 
key terms of the law, including “violent video game”); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746.1 (2010) (providing, in 
relevant part, that “[a] person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video 
game to a minor”); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746.2 (2010) (requiring that “[e]ach violent video game that is 
imported into or distributed in California for retail sale shall be labeled with a solid white ‘18’ outlined in 
black”). 
7 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (opining that a content-based 
regulation of speech “can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” and explaining that “[i]f a statute 
regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest”); see also Joel Timmer, Violence as Obscenity: Offensiveness and the First Amendment, 15 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 28 (2010) (explaining that “[l]aws restricting such content generally are subjected to 
strict scrutiny, the standard typically applied to content-based restrictions on fully protected speech” and 
that “[u]nder strict scrutiny, the government must show that a restriction is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest and that the restriction is narrowly drawn to achieve that end”). 
8 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738–39 (holding that “California cannot meet that standard” because, in large part, 
it could not “show a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors” and because any 
effects that could be shown “are both small and indistinguishable from effects produced by other media”). 
9 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
10 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (providing that under “our First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech”); 
see also Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008) (providing an 
excellent analysis of overbreadth within the context of criminal statutes); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and 
Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011) (examining misconceptions and 
misunderstandings about facial challenges, including overbreadth). 
11 After the United States Supreme Court declared the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2009), 
unconstitutional in United States v. Stevens, Congress quickly amended it by adopting the Animal Crush 
Video Prohibition Act of 2010. See Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 
Stat. 3177 (2010) (amending 18 USCA § 48 and defining an animal crush video as “any photograph, 
motion-picture film, video or digital recording, or electronic image that (1) depicts actual conduct in which 
[one] or more living non-human [animals] is intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, 
or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury . . . and (2) is obscene” violating a criminal prohibition on 
cruelty to animals under federal law or the law of the state in which the depiction is created, sold, 
distributed, or offered for sale or distribution). 
12 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582.  
13 Each of the three cases described in the first paragraph may be considered “high profile” due to the 
mainstream news media coverage it generated. For instance, when the Supreme Court ruled in Brown, the 
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magazines and movies behind bars flew largely under the mainstream news media’s radar 
in 2011.14 These cases centered on a myriad of cultural media artifacts, such as: 1) a 
quarterly magazine called Crime, Justice & America distributed to county jail inmates in 
California;15 2) a Japanese-style, comic-book magazine called Shonen Jump depicting 
cartoons children watch on television;16 3) a D.H. Lawrence book called Divas and 
Lovers—The Erotic Art of Studio Manassé featuring portraits from the 1920s and 1930s 
era of cinema and cabaret in Vienna;17 4) a prison policy that uses the ubiquitous Motion 
Picture Association of America’s rating system to help determine what movies inmates 
are allowed to watch;18 5) the ability of inmates to play video games on conventional 
gaming systems including Xbox Elite, Play Station 3, and Wii;19 6) the efforts of a free 
man to mail a prisoner a compact disc set entitled Dylan Thomas: The Caedmon 
                                                                                                                                            
decision was reported on the front pages of major newspapers across the United States. See, e.g., Robert 
Barnes, Limits on Video Games Rejected, WASH. POST, June 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting on Brown as 
“striking down as unconstitutional California’s attempt to ban the sale of violent games to minors”); Joan 
Biskupic, Ruling Puts Regulation in Game Designers’ Control, USA TODAY, June 27, 2011, at 1A 
(heralding the decision in Brown as “groundbreaking” and asserting that it “represents a landmark moment 
for the gaming industry and lifts a threat to its creative development”); Bob Egelko, Violent Video Game 
Ban Doomed by Free Expression Concerns, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting on the Brown 
decision); Adam Liptak, Minors Can Buy Violent Games, Justices Decide, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at 
A1 (reporting on the decision and calling it the “latest in a series of rulings protecting free speech, joining 
ones on funeral protests, videos showing cruelty to animals and political speech by corporations”); David 
G. Savage, State’s Law on Video Games Voided, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting that “the 
Supreme Court ended its term with a vigorous defense of free speech, striking down a California law that 
banned sales of violent video games to minors and effectively shielding the entertainment industry from 
any government effort to limit violent content”).  
14 See infra Part II (addressing these cases). 
15 Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2011). According to its website, the magazine is: 
a quarterly 40-page mainstream magazine about the criminal justice system [that] is distributed 
free to the county inmates in nearly 70 counties in 13 states including California, Nevada, 
Washington State, Arizona, Florida, Illinois and more. Since 2002, we have published 15 different 
editions and over 1,200,000 copies! Crime, Justice & America magazine has provided not just 
desired, but sorely needed information to the newly arrested in the local criminal justice systems. 
About CJA, CRIME, JUSTICE & AMERICA, http://crimejusticeandamerica.com/aboutcja (last visited May 8, 
2012). 
16 Kaden v. Slykhuis, 651 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2011); see also WEEKLY SHONEN JUMP ALPHA, 
http://shonenjump.viz.com (last visited May 8, 2012) (providing the website for this popular manga 
magazine). Manga comic books, which are typically printed in black and white, are read back-to-front and 
“look more like cheap paperbacks than traditional comics.” Maja Beckstrom, Manga Mania, SAINT PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 24, 2005, at 1E. See Matthew Price, Japanese Graphic Novel Tops Charts in U.S., 
OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 19, 2004, at 16D (describing Shonen Jump as “an anthology magazine featuring 
popular comics aimed primarily at boys and young men”). 
17 Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing D.H. LAWRENCE, DIVAS AND LOVERS: THE 
EROTIC ART OF STUDIO MANASSE (Margot Bettauer Dembo trans. 1998)). 
18 Avila v. Cate, No. 1:10-cv-01208, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (considering 
the use of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) rating system). The MPAA rating system 
seeks to provide “basic information to parents about the level of various elements in the film, such as sex, 
violence and language so that parents can decide what their children can and cannot see,” and adding that 
“they help protect the freedom of expression of filmmakers and this dynamic American art form.” What 
Each Rating Means, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/what-each-
rating-means (last visited May 8, 2012).  
19 Graham v. Sharp, No. 10-5563, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66675 (D. N.J. June 20, 2011). 
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Collection20 featuring “Thomas reading his poetry and prose, and also [a] reading of 
some of his favorite writers, including W.H. Auden and William Shakespeare”;21 and 7) 
an inmate’s ability to subscribe to “lad magazines”22 including Maxim,23 Stuff, and 
FHM.24 
Although these disputes may seem petty, trivial or insignificant for the non-
incarcerated, the reality is that millions of Americans—particularly minorities25—are 
affected by the suppression of speech behind bars. The Baltimore Sun, for example, noted 
in an August 2011 editorial that “[t]he United States contains just 5 percent of the world’s 
population, yet its prisons house nearly a quarter of all the people incarcerated around the 
globe. We imprison our citizens at a greater rate than any other country.”26 California 
alone had more than 143,000 inmates in its state system that same month.27  
In his recent book, Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire, Robert 
Perkinson writes that one of every thirteen Hispanics in the United States has been 
incarcerated and, even more dramatically, one of every six African-American males.28 
Perkinson adds that “a generation after the triumphs of the civil rights movement, African 
Americans are incarcerated at seven times the rate of whites, nearly double the disparity 
                                                
20 North v. Clarke, No. 3:11-cv-211, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84917 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2011). In February 
2012, United States District Judge James R. Spencer granted inmate Owen North’s motion for summary 
judgment and concluded that a Virginia Department of Corrections’s policy that prohibited all secular, non-
music CDs was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and thus violated the First 
Amendment. North v. Clarke, No. 3:11-cv-211, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15204 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2012). 
21 Dena Potter, Louisiana Man Sues Virginia Prison System After Denial of Literary CD, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 
Apr. 5, 2011, at B3. A recent article in the Library Journal describes the collection in which: 
the Welsh poet uses his wonderfully rich and tactile voice to read his poetry, as well as the lovely 
A Child’s Christmas in Wales and a selection of other works. The recordings, the earliest of which 
was made in 1952, have just enough reverb to evoke turn-of-the-century microphones à la The 
King’s Speech. Part of Caedmon’s remarkable series of poets reading their own work, this 
collection gathers a number of different recordings that feature Thomas’s extraordinary musical 
voice. 
Neal Wyatt, The Reader’s Shelf; Story Hour: Authors Read Their Own Works, LIBRARY J., Sept. 1, 2011, at 
139. 
22 See Charles McGrath, How Hef Got His Groove Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at MM 24 (observing 
that “for a while Playboy appeared to have been crowded off the newsstands by the so-called lad 
magazines—Maxim, Stuff, FHM and the like,” and adding that “[o]f the major lad mags, only Maxim still 
stands, and one of its former editors, 36-year-old Jimmy Jellinek, two years ago became editorial director 
of Playboy”). 
23 Maxim has been described as featuring a “mixture of scantily clad B-list starlets, college-fraternity humor 
and useful information on gadgets, clothes and other preoccupations of young, affluent men.” Lorne Manly, 
A Lad Mag and a Brand in Las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2006, at C1. 
24 DePuente-Hudson v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-01228, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16421 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 
2011). 
25 See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (presenting data regarding the incarceration of minorities 
in the United States). 
26 Editorial, Downsizing Maryland’s Prisons, BALT. SUN, Aug. 14, 2011, at 20A. 
27 See Marisa Lagos, Moving Inmates Won’t Be Enough, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2011, at A1 (noting that 
California “appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in May that California must cut the number of 
prisoners from 143,500 to 110,000 by 2013”). 
28 ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE 2 (2010). 
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measured before desegregation.”29 George Mason University Professor Roger Lancaster 
recently observed that: 
Starting in the 1970s, lawmakers across the United States enacted punitive 
“lock ’em up” policies. The prison population more than quadrupled, and 
the United States became first in the world in both the total number of 
prisoners (about 2.3 million) and the rate of imprisonment (1 of every 100 
adults is behind bars).30 
At the end of 2011, the total population of federal inmates was slightly more than 
218,000.31 This figure has increased steadily over the past dozen years, with the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) having a total inmate population of fewer than 165,000 in fiscal 
year 2001—a figure that rose to slightly more than 208,000 during fiscal year 2009.32 
While the current economic crisis in the United States may soon force some states 
to cut their prison budgets and, in turn, their prison populations,33 that is scant relief for 
those now incarcerated. In brief, the First Amendment speech rights of about one out of 
every 100 adults34 are affected by the judiciary’s behind-bars jurisprudence. Ultimately, 
as David L. Hudson, Jr., of the First Amendment Center writes in profoundly understated 
fashion, “prisoners—whatever they have done—are still human beings worthy of some 
level of respect.”35 
Are courts too quick today to support the censorial proclivities of prison officials? 
Do judges too readily capitulate to the concerns of those tasked with overseeing the 
incarcerated? Those are the key questions this Article addresses on the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s critical ruling in Turner v. Safley,36 
                                                
29 Id. at 3.  
30 Roger N. Lancaster, Op-Ed., Sex Offenders: The Last Pariahs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at SR6. 
31 Federal Prison System FY 2013 Budget Request at a Glance, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE 2, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013summary/pdf/fy13-bop-bud-summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 
21, 2012); see also Inmate Population, Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp#1 (last visited Dec. 8, 2011). The data made available by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons are updated each month; the data reflected in this Article are from the Bureau of 
Prisons’s figures as of October 29, 2011, that were publicly available on December 8, 2011.  
32 Federal Bureau of Prisons, State of the Bureau 2009: The Bureau’s Core Values, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 
2, available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/sob09.pdf (last visited Feb. 20. 2012).  
33 See Krissah Thompson, Group Presses States to Cut Prison Spending, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2011, at A2 
(reporting that “[a]dvocates of overhauling the U.S. criminal justice system see a bright spot in the dire 
financial straits that states are facing: Politicians eager to trim budgets are willing to cut spending on 
prisons and corrections programs”). 
34 Lancaster, supra note 30, at Opinion 6. 
35 David L. Hudson, Jr., Why I Care About Prisoner Rights, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/why-i-care-about-prisoner-rights. Hudson explains this point by 
quoting the late Justice Thurgood Marshall for the proposition that “[w]hen the prison gates slam behind an 
inmate, he does not lose his human quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not 
cease to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is 
his quest for self-realization concluded.” Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., concurring)). 
36 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
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which largely provides the judicial lens through which restrictions on inmates’ speech 
rights are analyzed.37  
Part I provides an overview of the United States Supreme Court’s framework for 
examining First Amendment access-to-speech disputes involving incarcerated 
individuals.38 Importantly, Part I also reveals a rift among the current justices on the 
standards that should be applied to inmate cases, with Justices Clarence Thomas and 
Antonin Scalia subscribing to a novel approach they have twice endorsed in concurring 
opinions.39  
Part II then analyzes eight federal court decisions from 2010 and 2011 affecting 
inmates’ access to popular forms of media content, paying particular attention to the 
amount of deference (or lack thereof) courts grant to prison officials’ reasoning and 
rationales for behind-bars censorship.40 Next, Part III questions and criticizes the 
assumptions courts seem to make about the harms that certain media products will cause 
or create within prison environments.41 It juxtaposes those assumptions with other areas 
of First Amendment jurisprudence in which a much more rigorous analysis of the 
causation-of-harm question is mandated. Finally, the Article concludes in Part IV by 
arguing that the odds are slim to none that a prisoner in an access-to-speech controversy 
will prevail today under Turner without a particularly outrageous and egregious set of 
facts or without having the fortune of drawing a decidedly pro-free speech jurist.42 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FRACTURED FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK FOR 
EVALUATING THE SPEECH RIGHTS OF INMATES 
The last time the United States Supreme Court squarely addressed a case involving 
the First Amendment right of inmates to access media content was more than five years 
ago, back in 2006 in Beard v. Banks.43 Beard centered on a Pennsylvania prison policy 
that prohibits the most “specially dangerous and recalcitrant inmates”44 from accessing 
any newspapers and magazines.45 Under the policy, the only media content these inmates 
may possess are “legal and personal correspondence, religious and legal materials, two 
library books, and writing paper.”46 
Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the judgment of the Court in a plurality opinion 
joined by three justices47 and with which another two justices concurred in the result.48 
                                                
37 See infra Part I (providing an overview of Turner and the other Supreme Court-fashioned frameworks for 
analyzing restrictions on the constitutional rights of inmates). 
38 Infra notes 43–112 and accompanying text. 
39 Infra notes 74–90 and accompanying text. 
40 Infra notes 113–332 and accompanying text. 
41 Infra notes 333–347 and accompanying text. 
42 Infra notes 348–359 and accompanying text. 
43 548 U.S. 521 (2006).  
44 Id. at 525. 
45 See id. at 526 (noting that, under the policy at issue for prisoners in Level 2 of Pennsylvania’s Long Term 
Segregation Unit, inmates “have no access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs”). 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 524 (noting that Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in 
which Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter joined). 
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Justice Breyer explained that the basic, substantive principles governing the case were 
rooted in the Court’s 1987 opinion, Turner v. Safley,49 and its 2003 decision, Overton v. 
Bazzetta.50 Drawing from and synthesizing these two prisoner-rights cases, Breyer made 
clear that: 1) prisoners do possess First Amendment speech rights;51 2) those rights, 
however, are not the same as those possessed by non-incarcerated individuals;52 3) 
substantial deference must be granted to prison officials when evaluating restrictions on 
prisoners’ rights;53 and 4) the constitutional rights of prisoners may be permissibly 
abridged if the regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological concerns.54 A 
fifth point is important here—the burden “is not on the State to prove the validity of 
prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.”55 In brief, the incarcerated face an 
uphill battle of both burden and deference when attempting to disprove the 
reasonableness of a restriction on their First Amendment rights. 
In determining reasonableness of the alleged penological concerns asserted by 
prison officials, Justice Breyer reiterated a four-factor test established twenty-five years 
ago in Turner: 1) “there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison 
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;” 2) whether 
inmates possess alternative means and avenues of exercising the right in question; 3) the 
affect that accommodating the asserted constitutional right will have on guards, other 
inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and 4) whether there are “obvious, easy 
alternatives” to censorship that can accommodate “the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost 
to valid penological interests” or, in contrast, whether there is an “absence of ready 
alternatives.”56 
The Turner test amounts to a very relaxed form of judicial scrutiny57—the Court 
calls it a “reasonableness standard,”58 in stark contrast to strict scrutiny.59 Professor 
Giovanna Shay asserts that Turner “emphasizes deference to prison officials and the 
                                                                                                                                            
48 See id. at 536–42 (Thomas, J., concurring) (setting forth the concurring opinion of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, which was joined by Justice Antonin Scalia). 
49 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
50 539 U.S. 126 (2003). 
51 See Beard, 548 U.S. at 528 (explaining that “[t]his Court recognized in Turner that imprisonment does 
not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain important constitutional protections, including those of the 
First Amendment”). 
52 See id. (writing that “the Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than 
it would allow elsewhere”). 
53 See id. (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 132, for the proposition that “courts owe ‘substantial deference to 
the professional judgment of prison administrators’”). 
54 Id.  
55 Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. 
56 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
The Court made it clear in Turner that, on this fourth reasonableness factor, prison officials need not 
exhaust all possible options, writing that “prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every 
conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id.  
57 See Matthew D. Rose, Prisoners and Public Employees: Bridges to a New Future in Prisoners’ Free 
Speech Retaliation Claims, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 159, 160 (2009) (observing that Turner “established a 
very deferential rational basis standard of review”). 
58 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). 
59 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the strict scrutiny standard). 
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relative technical and administrative expertise of corrections authorities.”60 Indeed, as 
Professor Christopher Smith notes, “[p]risoners seldom prevail when judges apply the 
Turner test.”61  
Turner also closely tracks the exceedingly limited press freedom given to public 
high school students who write for and edit their school-sponsored newspapers.62 In brief, 
both minors on campus and adults behind bars are treated as second-class citizens. As 
David Hudson points out, the similarity in treatment the two groups receive in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, just one year after Turner was decided, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled in the student-speech case of Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier63 “that school officials could censor student speech if their actions were 
‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’ The Court simply substituted the 
word ‘pedagogical’ for ‘penological.’ When I lecture on this substitution to student 
groups, there normally is a collective gasp.”64 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained in Turner the reasons for such slackened 
review in inmate cases: 
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible 
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate 
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable 
problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the 
decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be 
subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that 
it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand.65 
Applying this test in Beard, the plurality concluded that prison officials had 
adequately justified the need for the newspaper and magazine access ban imposed on 
only the most dangerous and recalcitrant inmates.66 In reaching this conclusion, Justice 
                                                
60 Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 341 (2009). 
61 Christopher E. Smith, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Corrections Law, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 477, 
491 (2009). 
62 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that “educators do not offend 
the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns”) (emphasis added); see also Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and in Prison, 85 
WASH. L. REV. 71, 73 (2010) (asserting that “judicial opinions about freedom of speech compare schools 
and prisons without irony, and indeed without hesitation. Courts litter their decisions about prisoner speech 
with citations to decisions about student speech and vice versa. Many judges treat the analogy as if it were 
innately persuasive”); Alana M. Sitterly, Silencing Death Row Inmates: How Hammer v. Ashcroft Needs a 
Rational Basis for Its Rational Basis, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 323, 327 (2011) (observing that 
“[f]ree speech restrictions in prisons can also be examined through the lens of similar restrictions in public 
schools. While free speech rights in public schools do not mirror those within prisons, similar legal 
considerations underlie both institutions”). 
63 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
64 Hudson, supra note 35. 
65 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
66 Justice Breyer wrote: 
While we do not deny the constitutional importance of the interests in question, we find, on the 
basis of the record now before us, that prison officials have set forth adequate legal support for the 
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Breyer noted that Pennsylvania offered several reasons for the prohibition “including the 
need to motivate better behavior on the part of particularly difficult prisoners, the need to 
minimize the amount of property they control in their cells, and the need to ensure prison 
safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of material a prisoner might use to start a 
cell fire.”67 Breyer found that the first of these justifications—providing increased 
incentives for inmates to rehabilitate their behavior by depriving them of media content—
was adequate to support the ban and he went no further into the other interests.68 The 
ostensible incentive for good behavior, under the Pennsylvania policy, is that positive 
conduct eventually leads to “somewhat less severe restrictions, including the right to 
receive one newspaper and five magazines.”69 Justice Breyer thus reasoned that “[t]he 
articulated connections between newspapers and magazines, the deprivation of virtually 
the last privilege left to an inmate, and a significant incentive to improve behavior, are 
logical ones.”70 
The plurality’s analysis in Beard has been criticized for effectively “reducing the 
four [reasonableness] factors to one.”71 Indeed, Justice Breyer wrote that “the second, 
third, and fourth factors, being in a sense logically related to the Policy itself, here add 
little, one way or another, to the first factor’s basic logical rationale.”72 He added that: 
The real task in this case is not balancing these factors, but rather 
determining whether the Secretary [of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections] shows more than simply a logical relation, that is, whether he 
shows a reasonable relation. We believe the material presented here by the 
prison officials is sufficient to demonstrate that the Policy is a reasonable 
one.73 
But the Court’s 2006 plurality decision in Beard v. Banks also reveals a fissure 
among the justices regarding the legal standard under which to evaluate deprivation of 
rights behind bars. Specifically, Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion 
that was joined by Justice Antonin Scalia.74 Thomas and Scalia rejected the Breyer 
plurality’s deployment of the Turner test and, instead, endorsed a standard that Justice 
Thomas had framed in his earlier concurrence in Overton v. Bazzetta, calling it “the least 
perilous approach for resolving challenges to prison regulations, as well as the approach 
that is most faithful to the Constitution.”75 
                                                                                                                                            
policy. And the plaintiff, a prisoner who attacks the policy, has failed to set forth “specific facts” 
that, in light of the deference that courts must show to the prison officials, could warrant a 
determination in his favor. 
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006). 
67 Id. at 530.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 526. 
70 Id. at 531–32.  
71 Sanford L. Bohrer & Matthew S. Bohrer, Just the Facts, Ma’am—Determining the Constitutional Claims 
of Inmates to the Sanctity of Their Legal Mail, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 900 (2009).  
72 Beard, 548 U.S. at 532. 
73 Id. at 533.  
74 Id. at 536–42 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
75 Id. at 537 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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In Overton, Justice Thomas was again joined by Justice Scalia in an opinion 
concurring in the judgment.76 Justice Thomas wrote that “[s]tates are free to define and 
redefine all types of punishment, including imprisonment, to encompass various types of 
deprivations—provided only that those deprivations are consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment.”77  
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,”78 and it applies to 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.79 The United States 
Supreme Court recently observed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
“prohibits the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances”80 
and represents “the essential principle that, under the Eighth Amendment, the State must 
respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.”81 
In Overton, Justice Thomas wrote that “[t]he only provision of the Constitution that 
speaks to the scope of criminal punishment is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment.”82 Importantly, and with regard to restrictions imposed on a 
prisoner once he or she is incarcerated, Justice Thomas reasoned that “[s]entencing a 
criminal to a term of imprisonment may, under state law, carry with it the implied 
delegation to prison officials to discipline and otherwise supervise the criminal while he 
is incarcerated.”83 He emphasized that “a sentence encompasses the extinction of a 
constitutional right enjoyed by free persons turns on state law, for it is a State’s 
prerogative to determine how it will punish violations of its law, and this Court awards 
great deference to such determinations.”84 
For Beard’s ban of newspaper and magazine access, Justice Thomas’s standard 
examined “whether Pennsylvania intended to confer upon respondent and other inmates a 
right to have unfettered access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs.”85 He 
initially determined that Pennsylvania had impliedly delegated to prison officials, as part 
of the sentencing process, the ability to enforce “rules and disciplinary measures set forth 
by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.”86 Put more simply, such regulations are 
incorporated into prison sentences.87 
Justice Thomas’s Eighth Amendment test is even more deferential to prison 
officials than the Turner standard used by Justice Breyer and the plurality in Beard. As 
one commentator observed, the deference granted under Justice Thomas’ standard 
“exceeds the grant of deference by the plurality and grants absolute deference to states 
and prison officials to entirely eliminate constitutional rights with only the Eighth 
                                                
76 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 138–45 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
79 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (noting that the Eighth Amendment “is applicable to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
80 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). 
81 Id.  
82 Overton, 539 U.S. at 140 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
83 Id. (emphasis added). 
84 Id.  
85 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 538 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
86 Id.  
87 See id. (writing that “these regulations are included in the prison sentence”). 
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Amendment as a limit.”88 Thomas’s view may constitute what Professor Christopher 
Smith dubs a “novel assertion,”89 but his view was shared by Justice Scalia, who joined 
with Thomas in both Overton and Beard. It is, ultimately as Professor Smith writes 
elsewhere, “an extraordinarily limited view of prisoners’ rights.”90 
Beard included two dissents—one authored by Justice John Paul Stevens and 
joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,91 and one penned by Justice Ginsburg.92 These 
dissents provide some hope for the future of prisoners’ speech rights, despite the fact that 
Justice Stevens retired and thus is no longer on the Court. As with Justice Breyer’s 
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens also found that Turner provided the correct standard 
under which to analyze the magazine and newspaper access ban.93 In applying that test, 
however, Justice Stevens seemed to appreciably ratchet up the level of review,94 while 
adding several healthy doses of dicta that certainly can be considered pro-prisoner 
rights,95 such as characterizing Pennsylvania’s newspaper and magazine ban as coming 
“perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control.”96 
Justice Stevens expressed more than a little skepticism at the incentive-through-
deprivation rationale—Pennsylvania’s holding back of all newspapers and magazines, 
with the down-the-road promise of access to them if a prisoner behaves better97—that the 
                                                
88 Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Note, Rendering Turner Toothless: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Beard v. 
Banks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1209, 1225–26 (2008).  
89 Smith, supra note 61, at 496.  
90 Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L. REV. 853, 869 
(2011).  
91 Beard, 548 U.S. at 542–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 553–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote that while she joined “Justice Stevens’ 
dissenting opinion in full, I direct this separate writing to the plurality's apparent misapprehension of the 
office of summary judgment” Id. at 553. 
93 Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing that “[w]hen a prison regulation impinges upon First 
Amendment freedoms, it is invalid unless ‘it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests’”) 
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 
94 See infra notes 97–105 and accompanying text. 
95 For instance, Justice Stevens opined that “the rule at issue in this case strikes at the core of the First 
Amendment rights to receive, to read, and to think.” Beard, 548 U.S. at 543 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Typically, one might expect to find such language about core First Amendment rights in a case addressing 
limitations on political speech, not prisoner access to media products. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 
130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (holding that “[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use 
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to 
protect it”).  
Justice Stevens reasoned that “the complete prohibition on secular, nonlegal newspapers, 
newsletters, and magazines prevents prisoners from ‘receiv[ing] suitable access to social, political, esthetic, 
moral, and other ideas,’ which are central to the development and preservation of individual identity, and 
are clearly protected by the First Amendment.” Beard, 548 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Certainly 
such dictum taps directly into the theory of self-realization and self-fulfillment through expression. See C. 
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) 
(writing that speech must be protected not only “as a means to a collective good but because of the value of 
speech conduct to the individual”); Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in 
America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 960 (2004) (writing that “free speech is valuable because it promotes and 
reflects human personality and is an essence of human dignity. Autonomy to think, listen, and speak for 
oneself is essential to a free and self-determining human being”). 
96 Beard, 548 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
97 Supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (describing this incentives-based approach). 
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plurality readily accepted. Justice Stevens explained that Pennsylvania’s “deprivation 
theory of rehabilitation,”98 which is premised on the notion that “[a]ny deprivation of 
something a prisoner desires gives him an added incentive to improve his behavior,”99 
involves “no limiting principle; if sufficient, it would provide a ‘rational basis’ for any 
regulation that deprives a prisoner of a constitutional right so long as there is at least a 
theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain the right at some future time by 
modifying his behavior.”100 Stevens thus concluded that a reasonable fact finder could 
find that Pennsylvania’s measured an “an exaggerated response”101 to its otherwise 
legitimate interest in rehabilitation.  
Justice Stevens also questioned another of Pennsylvania’s justifications, namely 
that magazines and newspapers constitute flammable material that a prisoner might use to 
start a fire in his cell.102 Observing that the prisoners affected by the ban in question 
already possess a large number of materials in their cells that could be used to start a 
fire,103 Justice Stevens reasoned that “it does not follow, as a matter of logic, that 
preventing inmates from possessing a single copy of a secular, nonlegal newspaper, 
newsletter, or magazine will have any measurable effect on the likelihood that inmates 
will start fires, hide contraband, or engage in other dangerous actions.”104 To buttress this 
assessment, Justice Stevens pointed to the factual record which actually contradicted this 
justification, as the deputy superintendent of the Pennsylvania prisons made it clear 
during a deposition that “inmates could engage in any of the behaviors that worried 
prison officials without using banned materials.”105 
Finally, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg penned a dissent seconding Justice Stevens’ 
analysis, writing that “Stevens comprehensively explains why the justifications advanced 
by the Secretary of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections do not warrant pretrial 
dismissal of Ronald Banks’s complaint alleging arbitrary deprivation of access to the 
news of the day.”106 Adding her own examples of the blatant inconsistencies with 
Pennsylvania’s newspaper-deprivation policy—inconsistencies that Justice Ginsburg 
found made it arbitrary and irrational under Turner107—she noted that “[t]he regulation 
denies The Christian Science Monitor to inmates housed in level 2 of the prison’s long-
term segregation unit but allows them The Jewish Daily Forward, based on the 
determination of a prison official that the latter qualifies as a religious publication and the 
                                                
98 Beard, 548 U.S. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 552.  
102 Id. at 543–44.  
103 In particular, each inmate is provided with: 
a jumpsuit, a blanket, two bedsheets, a pillow case, a roll of toilet paper, a copy of a prison 
handbook, ten sheets of writing paper, several envelopes, carbon paper, three pairs of socks, three 
undershorts and three undershirts, and may at any point also have religious newspapers, legal 
periodicals, a prison library book, Bibles, and a lunch tray with a plate and a cup. 
Id. at 543–44.  
104 Id. at 544. 
105 Id. at 545. 
106 Id. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. at 555. 
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former does not.”108 She wryly observed that “[p]risoners are allowed to read Harlequin 
romance novels but not to learn about the war in Iraq or Hurricane Katrina.”109 
Each of the opinions in Beard demonstrates the unsettled nature of free-speech 
rights behind bars: some justices apply Turner very deferentially, while others apply it 
much more rigorously, and still other justices—namely, Clarence Thomas and Antonin 
Scalia—reject the Turner test altogether in favor of an Eighth Amendment standard.110 
Further, liberal-leaning Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan had not yet joined the 
Court when Beard was decided, leaving one to wonder if they might join fellow female 
and liberal-tilting Justice Ginsburg in applying a tighter form of Turner review as she did 
in her Beard dissent. Conversely, Justice Samuel Alito, a nominee of President George 
W. Bush111 who has found himself isolated from all of his colleagues on the Court in 
several recent cases involving controversial forms of expression,112 also was not on the 
Court that heard Beard. Might Alito align himself with fellow conservative and male 
Republican appointees Justices Thomas and Scalia to endorse an Eighth Amendment 
approach?  
Such differences of opinion within Beard, along with a mix of new justices who 
have yet to express their own views about free speech behind bars while on the high 
court, leaves lower court judges with many possible directions to turn today when 
evaluating restrictions on inmates’ access to media content like books, magazines and 
movies.  
II. THE STATE OF FREE SPEECH & MEDIA CONTENT BEHIND BARS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS FROM 2010 AND 2011 
This Part of the Article first examines a quartet of federal appellate court cases 
from the past two years involving restrictions on common forms of media content behind 
bars.113 It then analyzes four federal district court decisions from the same period 
addressing similar issues.114 In the process, this part demonstrates the often vast 
deference accorded to prison officials and the steep, uphill battle that inmates must 
surmount when fighting for their First Amendment rights to access magazines, movies, 
music, and other popular forms of media materials. 
While there were numerous other federal court decisions rendered in 2010 and 
2011 involving the free speech rights of inmates,115 the ones scrutinized below were 
                                                
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Supra notes 74–90 and accompanying text (describing Justice Thomas’s relevant concurring opinions 
and his Eighth Amendment standard).  
111 See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 8, 2012) (noting that Alito was 
nominated to the Court by President George W. Bush). 
112 Justice Alito authored solo dissents in the crush-video case of United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 
(2010), and in the Westboro Baptist Church funeral-protest case of Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011). 
113 See subpart II.A. 
114 See subpart II.B. 
115 More than fifteen other cases were decided by federal courts at both the district court and appellate court 
levels during this time period. See infra Appendix for examples from this list.  
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chosen for analysis by the authors in part because they cover a wide range of fact patterns 
and in part because they illustrate differing levels of deference to Turner a quarter-
century after it was decided by the high court. Eight opinions in total were also selected 
for purposes of parsimony, lest this article become too lengthy. Readers are encouraged 
to review for themselves the other 2010 and 2011 decisions not examined in detail 
here.116 The authors did not examine First Amendment-based claims regarding religious 
reading materials, which raise additional Free Exercise Clause concerns. 
A. Federal Appellate Court Opinions 
1. Deprivation of Sexually Explicit Materials 
In February 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 
Sperry v. Werholtz117 rejected an inmate’s First Amendment-based civil rights 
challenge118 to a Kansas Department of Corrections’ (KDOC) policy providing that “[n]o 
inmate shall have in possession or under control any sexually explicit materials, including 
drawings, paintings, writing, pictures, items, and devices.”119 Sperry, an inmate at the 
Lansing Correctional Facility who was forced to dispose of ten to twelve adult magazines 
in order to comply with the regulation,120 was initially rebuffed in his free-speech dispute 
in May 2010 when the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant Roger 
Werholtz, secretary of the KDOC.121 Nine months later, following the trial court’s lead in 
applying the Turner standard,122 the appellate court affirmed summary judgment, largely 
adopting and often quoting the lower court ruling.123 In doing so, the appellate court 
engaged in a very deferential form of review.124 It accepted Werholtz’s affidavit that the 
blanket ban, which applied to all inmates, not merely those who were sex offenders,125 
served multiple penological goals.126 
The goals stated by Werholtz included: 1) protecting institutional security because 
“[s]exually explicit materials can lead to the open performance of lewd acts”127 and 
because the very act of possessing such content might be used by some inmates to 
identify gay prisoners who are frequent targets of violent attacks;128 2) helping to treat 
                                                
116 See infra Appendix (listing those opinions and providing a brief parenthetical for each that describes the 
key underlying facts and the judicial outcome).  
117 413 Fed. Appx. 31 (10th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011). 
118 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010) (providing remedies for “an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress” for individuals deprived of civil rights by any person acting “under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia”). 
119 Sperry, 413 Fed. Appx. at 34. 
120 Id. at 33. 
121 Sperry v. Werholtz, No. 04-3125-CM2010, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49116 (D. Kan. May 18, 2010). 
122 Sperry, 413 Fed. Appx. at 39–42.  
123 Id. at 42. 
124 Infra notes 132–137 and accompanying text. 
125 See Sperry, 413 Fed. Appx. at 41 (using the term “blanket ban” to describe the policy). 
126 See id. at 40 (writing that “[w]e agree with the district court that the governmental objectives underlying 
Kansas Administrative Regulation § 44-12-313 are legitimate and neutral and that the regulation is 
rationally related to those objections”). 
127 Id. at 40. 
128 Id. at 41. 
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and manage sex offenders because, without a ban applicable to all inmates, non-sex 
offenders might trade sexually explicit material with sex offenders;129 and 3) mitigating 
possible sexual harassment complaints by prison staff who had previously “complained 
about being required to view these materials while performing their duties”130 and who 
alleged that inmates had openly compared them to individuals depicted in the sexual 
content.131 Collectively, this trio of justifications boils down to security, treatment, and 
fear of litigation.  
The fear-of-litigation justification certainly seems tenuous because it is not a fear of 
lawsuits filed by inmates but rather lawsuits brought by the very people who are charged 
with watching them. If censorship of speech can be justified by the possible reaction that 
government officials—prison security guards—might have to the speech, then censorship 
is a certain result. This justification has nothing to do with either protecting or treating 
prisoners but has everything to do with protecting the government from expensive 
lawsuits.  
The Tenth Circuit’s deference to and relaxed application of Turner was evident at 
several points in Sperry. For instance, in applying the first of the four Turner factors—
namely, whether a valid and rational connection exists between the regulation and the 
asserted legitimate governmental interest—the appellate court wrote that prison officials 
are not required to prove either that the banned materials previously caused problems or 
that they are likely to result in future problems.132 The Tenth Circuit stressed that 
“empirical evidence is not necessarily required”133 and that “[t]he only question that we 
must answer is whether the defendants’ judgment was ‘rational,’ that is, whether the 
defendants might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests.”134 
The Tenth Circuit also made it clear that two items are irrelevant in this analysis: 1) 
whether or not the regulation on sexually explicit material actually advances any of the 
purported government interests; and 2) whether the court disagrees with the policy 
itself.135 
In perhaps the most glaring form of deference, the Tenth Circuit refused to strike 
the assertions in the affidavit of KDOC Secretary Werholtz despite acknowledging that 
“paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the affidavit are very conclusory in terms of showing a rational 
connection between the ban on sexually explicit materials and the asserted penological 
interests of prison security, prevention of sexual harassment, and treatment of sex 
offenders.”136 Rather than strike these paragraphs, the appellate court merely “urge[d] 
prison officials to be more thorough and specific in future cases.”137 Viewed cynically, 
this seems somewhat akin to a “we’ll let you get away with it this time, but don’t push us 
again” approach that reflects a very relaxed review of governmental justifications for 
intrusions on the free speech rights of inmates. 
                                                
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 40. 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 39 n.4.  
137 Id.  
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Finally, adding monetary injury to First Amendment insult, the appellate court 
closed its opinion by reminding Jeffrey Sperry, a pro se plaintiff and appellant, that he 
needed to continue to make partial payments on his appellate filing fee until it was paid in 
full.138 A dozen adult magazines and filing fees later, Sperry had lost his property and 
case, with the appellate court seconding the district court’s lead in applying a very 
deferential form of the Turner test. 
2. Dangerous Fantasies? Dispossessed of Dungeons and Dragons 
Gang activity behind bars probably is not the first thing that comes to mind when 
one thinks of the role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons (D & D),139 but that was the 
concern that animated the dispute in Singer v. Raemisch.140 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Singer upheld a regulation at Wisconsin’s Waupun 
Correctional Institution that banned possession of D & D materials, such as books and 
magazines about the game, and prohibited inmates from playing D & D.141 The January 
2010 ruling affirmed summary judgment for prison officials142 and came as a blow to 
plaintiff Kevin Singer,143 whom the appellate court described as a long-time and devoted 
D & D player. 144  
For several years prior to the ban, he had “frequently ordered D & D publications 
and game materials by mail and had them delivered to his cell.”145 Singer’s role-playing 
fantasy behind bars came to a crashing halt, however, after the prison’s disruptive group 
coordinator received an anonymous letter expressing “concern that Singer and three other 
inmates were forming a D & D gang and were trying to recruit others to join by passing 
around their D & D publications and touting the ‘rush’ they got from playing the 
game.”146 In what might cynically be considered as the height of overreaction to D & D 
spawned by an anonymous letter, Bruce Muraski, the facility’s expert on gangs, testified 
in seemingly irony-free fashion that he decided to “check into this gang before it gets out 
                                                
138 Id. at 42. 
139 See Leonore Fleischer, Treasure in the Dungeon, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1980, at Book World 15 
(describing D & D as “a role-playing fantasy game that transforms ordinary youngsters into treasure-
hunting elves, dwarves, magic-users, halflings and fearless fighters,” and adding that it “is just as popular 
on college campuses where sophisticated advanced players map out game strategies on their math 
departments’ already overloaded computers. Even 10-year-olds use their pocket calculators when playing 
D&D”). 
140 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010). 
141 Id. at 531 (affirming summary judgment for prison officials). 
142 United States District Judge J. P. Stadtmueller granted summary judgment for the defendants of Singer’s 
First Amendment claims in July 2007. See Singer v. Frank, No. 05-C-1040, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55663, 
at *64 (E.D. Wis. July 31, 2007) (concluding that “after applying the Turner factors, the plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy at issue in this case was 
reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests of maintaining safety and security and curbing 
gang activity”). 
143 Singer, according to one newspaper report on the case, “is in prison serving a life sentence for 
bludgeoning and stabbing his sister’s boyfriend to death.” Just Because Someone Looks Mostly Dead, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2010, at 6A. 
144 Singer, 593 F.3d at 532. 
145 Id. 
146 Id.  
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of hand.”147 Apparently for Muraski, D & D players are equivalent to members of the 
violent, national-level Bloods148 and Crips149 gangs.150 Thus, less than one month after 
Muraski received the letter, Singer was forced to give up possession of twenty-one books 
and fourteen magazines about D & D, as well as a ninety-six page, handwritten 
manuscript about D & D that Singer had penned.151  
Just what is D & D? In an article in the American Journal of Psychotherapy that 
explored how D & D was used by a young man with an obsessional, schizoid personality, 
Dr. Wayne Blackmon explained that D & D is: 
an imagination game. Worlds are created and the participants play 
characters in this imaginary world. Each player’s character is created 
according to a set of rules that govern abilities and classes of characters. 
Through complicated series of dice rolls, a character is dealt strength, 
intelligence, wisdom, dexterity, constitution, and charisma. The types of 
characters are clerics, dwarves, elves, fighters, halflings, magic users or 
thieves.152 
                                                
147 Id. (emphasis added). 
148 An April 2008 report to Congress, prepared by the United States Department of Justice, describes the 
Bloods as: 
an association of structured and unstructured gangs that have adopted a single gang culture. Large, 
national-level Bloods gangs include Bounty Hunter Bloods and Crenshaw Mafia Gangsters. 
Bloods membership is estimated to be 5,000 to 20,000; most members are African American 
males. Bloods gangs are active in 123 cities in 37 states. The main source of income for Bloods 
gangs is retail-level distribution of cocaine and marijuana. Bloods members also are involved in 
transporting and distributing methamphetamine, heroin and, to a much lesser extent, PCP 
(phencyclidine). The gangs also are involved in other criminal activity including assault, auto 
theft, burglary, carjacking, drive-by shooting, extortion, homicide, identification fraud, and 
robbery. 
Attorney General’s Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas, UNITED 
STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 2008), http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs27/27612/appendb.htm. 
149 The Crips are: 
a collection of structured and unstructured gangs that have adopted a common gang culture. Crips 
membership is estimated to be 30,000 to 35,000; most members are African American males from 
the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Large, national-level Crips gangs include Insane Gangster 
Crips, Rolling 90s Crips, and Shotgun Crips. Crips gangs operate in 221 cities in 41 states. The 
main source of income for Crips gangs is the street-level distribution of powder cocaine, crack 
cocaine, marijuana, and PCP. The gangs also are involved in other criminal activity such as 
assault, auto theft, burglary, and homicide. 
Id.  
150 The Bloods and the Crips are rival gangs whose members often are linked to shootings and murders. See 
generally Tom McGhee, Gangs Linked to RTD Shooting, DENVER POST, Aug. 21, 2011, at B-2 (describing 
a recent shooting incident in Colorado allegedly involving the Crips, and noting that Crips were fighting 
with possible Bloods gang members); Kelly Smith, Anguish in Powderhorn After Stabbing Death, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Aug. 21, 2011, at 2B (describing a recent killing in Minneapolis as “the result 
of a clash between the Bloods and Crips gangs”). 
151 Singer, 593 F.3d at 532. 
152 Wayne D. Blackmon, Dungeons and Dragons: The Use of a Fantasy Game in the Psychotherapeutic 
Treatment of a Young Adult, 48 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 624, 626 (1994). 
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The game certainly has not been without controversy.153 In 1985, it was blamed for 
the suicide of a thirteen-year-old Connecticut boy who regularly played D & D and, as 
the New York Times reported at the time, “[s]everal school boards around the country 
have banned the game on the ground that impressionable teen-agers cannot handle the 
violent role playing and occult imagery. Opponents of the game have cited several 
suicide notes as evidence that the game is responsible for some teen-age suicides.”154 
More recently, an eighteen-year-old man charged with raping and killing a 
developmentally disabled sixteen-year-old girl claimed “he was at a neighbor’s house 
playing the Dungeons and Dragons Online video game in an effort to ‘forget’”155 his 
gruesome actions earlier that day. 
Aside from such incidents, however, the game is generally associated with so-
called geeks, not gangs.156 Comedian Stephen Colbert has stated, “I’m a huge, huge geek. 
I played Dungeons and Dragons the first week it came out.”157 What is more, Kevin 
Singer was not your average jailhouse lawyer; he assembled fifteen affidavits regarding 
D & D, including three from “role-playing game experts. He contend[ed] that the 
affidavits demonstrate that there is no connection between D&D and gang activity. 
Several of Singer’s affiants indeed asserted the opposite: that D&D helps rehabilitate 
inmates and prevents them from joining gangs and engaging in other undesirable 
activities.”158 
So why did the appellate court sustain summary judgment against Kevin Singer? 
First, it applied Turner’s reasonably-related-to-legitimate-penological-concerns test and 
specified that of the four Turner factors used to determine reasonableness, “the first one 
can act as a threshold factor regardless which way it cuts.”159 Second, in applying this 
standard, the appellate court readily accepted what even it admitted was the “sole 
evidence”160 offered by prison officials to support the ban on D & D materials and the 
playing of the game—namely, the affidavit of Bruce Muraski, the facility’s gang 
expert.161 Muraski asserted that the prohibition was necessary, in part, to protect prison 
security because “cooperative games can mimic the organization of gangs and lead to the 
actual development thereof.”162 In addition to prison security, Muraski claimed the ban 
                                                
153 For instance, in 1990, Joseph Pottgen, Jr. of Lake City, Florida, was sentenced to twenty-two months in 
prison for allegedly digging up the grave of a suicide victim as part of playing D & D. Man Gets 22 Months 
for Robbing Grave, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 1990, at 2B.  
154 James Brooke, A Suicide Spurs Town to Debate Nature of a Game, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 1985), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/22/nyregion/a-suicide-spurs-town-to-debate-nature-of-a-
game.html. 
155 Carly Flandro, Neighbor Charged in Rape, Killing of Puyallup Teen, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at 
B1. 
156 See Frank Ahrens, ‘Rings’ Has Two Targets—Plan Is to Grab the Geeks So the Masses Will Follow, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at E1 (describing D & D as part of “classic geek markets” along with “Star 
Trek,” “Star Wars,” and “Buffy the Vampire Slayer”); Seth Borenstein, Obama Hailed for His Geeky 
Qualities, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (N.C.), Dec. 25, 2008, at 7A (reporting that “[g]eeks know and use 
references from ‘Star Trek,’ ‘Dungeons and Dragons’ and comic books”). 
157 Marc Peyser, The Truthiness Teller, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2006, at 50. 
158 Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 533. (7th Cir. 2010). 
159 Id. at 534. 
160 Id. at 535. 
161 Supra note 147 and accompanying text (describing Muraski).  
162 Singer, 593 F.3d at 535. 
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would help with inmate rehabilitation because, as he stated in his affidavit, D & D can 
“foster an inmate’s obsession with escaping from the real life, correctional environment, 
fostering hostility, violence and escape behavior.”163 In brief, the two interests cited were 
prison security and inmate rehabilitation. 
Singer, in contrast, challenged the existence of a rational relationship between those 
twin interests and the ban on D & D.164 The appellate court noted that Singer’s “eleven 
inmate affiants—who collectively served over 100 years in prison—all testified that they 
had never heard of any gang-related or other violent activity associated with D & D 
gameplay or paraphernalia.”165 Another affidavit, this one from Paul Cardwell, chair and 
archivist of the Committee for the Advancement of Role-Playing Games, contended that 
“there are numerous scholarly works establishing that role-playing games can have 
positive rehabilitative effects on prisoners.”166 
The appellate court, however, was not moved by any of Singer’s affidavits and 
dismissed them as “lack[ing] the qualifications necessary to determine whether the 
relationship between the D & D ban and the maintenance of prison security is ‘so remote 
as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.’”167 In other words, the appellate court 
deferentially treated the lone affidavit submitted by Muraski to justify the prison’s D & D 
policy while off-handedly dismissing Kevin Singer’s evidence. “[M]any of Singer’s 
affiants are present or former inmates, but their experiential ‘expertise’ in prison security 
is from the wrong side of the bars and fails to match Muraski’s perspective,”168 the 
appellate court wrote, adding that “[t]he expertise critical here is that relating to prisons, 
their security, and the prevention of prison gang activity. Singer’s affiants conspicuously 
lack such expertise.”169 
This judicial analysis puts prisoners who challenge regulations affecting their free-
speech rights in a perplexing predicament when it comes to gathering evidence and, in 
particular, expert testimony. How is an inmate, who lodges a pro se170 complaint—a 
lawsuit filed without the benefit of a trained attorney—supposed to round-up expert 
testimony? Pro se litigants, as Professor Kevin Smith observes, are “armed in most cases 
with more determination than legal expertise.”171 In a recent article, Professor Ira 
Robbins explains that: 
Compared with other litigants, pro se prisoners are at an inherent 
disadvantage. They lack many of the resources enjoyed by non-prisoner 
litigants. They have limited finances and restricted access to libraries, 
                                                
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id. at 536. 
166 Id. at 537. 
167 Id. at 536 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987)). 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 The term means “on one’s own behalf.” Henry Calloway, Access to Justice Pro Se: The Growth of Pro 
Se in Alabama, 63 ALA. LAW. 363, 363 (2002). 
171 Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Pro Se Petitions for Certiorari, 63 
ALB. L. REV. 381, 383 (1999). 
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legal materials, computers, the Internet, and even items that the non-
incarcerated take for granted—such as paper, pens, and telephones.172 
And while some pro se prisoner litigation may be frivolous,173 certainly a challenge 
involving the First Amendment right to possess reading materials, even if they are about 
D & D, is not inconsequential. Ultimately, in Singer, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
Muraski had “proffered evidence that the policy prohibiting possession of D & D 
manuals, strategy guides, character novellas, and other related materials is rationally 
related to the goal of preventing susceptible inmates from embarking upon a dangerous 
escapist path”174 and that Kevin Singer’s “affidavits and briefs were unresponsive to this 
evidence.”175 The appellate court noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Overton 
“mandates deference to the views of prison authorities.”176 
Attorney John G. Browning, a partner in the national law firm of Lewis Brisbois 
Bisgaard & Smith LLP, responded incredulously to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling: 
Seriously? I’ve seen “Oz” and “The Shawshank Redemption,” and I’m 
pretty sure what goes on in prisons bears no resemblance to a fantasy 
game played by the geeky kids from your high school. Unlike the judges 
on the 7th Circuit, I don’t think that in a prison’s sea of rampant violence, 
drug use, and illiteracy there’s much chance of an inmate standing up to a 
tattooed white supremacist convict by claiming to be a Level 12 paladin 
with a magical sword and a spell-resistant cloak.177 
The New York Times covered the appellate court’s decision as well, leading its 
story sarcastically with “[p]risons can restrict the rights of inmates to nerd out.”178 The 
Times’s story noted that Ilya Somin, an associate professor of law at George Mason 
University, queried on The Volokh Conspiracy legal blog, “[s]hould prisons ban ‘The 
Count of Monte Cristo’ on the grounds that it might encourage escape attempts?”179 
Somin told the New York Times in an interview, “[i]deally, you should really have more 
evidence that there is a genuine harm before you restrict something.”180 The decision was 
so shocking it even drew coverage across the Atlantic Ocean in the infamous English 
tabloid, the Sun.181 
                                                
172 Ira Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 271, 273 (2010). 
173 See generally Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 519 (1996) (addressing the topic of pro se prisoner litigation, and observing that “the 
burden of the vast number of frivolous prisoner suits has created hostility to the entire category of 
lawsuits—opposition that has the potential of obscuring the few meritorious prisoner lawsuits which are 
about as scarce as the proverbial needle in the haystack”). 
174 Singer, 593 F.3d at 538. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 534. 
177 John G. Browning, Legally Speaking: Your Tax Dollars at Work, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. (Feb. 9, 2010), 
http://www.setexasrecord.com/arguments/224636-legally-speaking-your-tax-dollars-at-work. 
178 John Schwartz, Court Upholds Prison Ban on Dungeons & Dragons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A16. 
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Murderer, Kevin Singer, SUN (England), Feb. 3, 2010, at News 12. 
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Ultimately, although Singer may be a convicted killer for whom little sympathy is 
due,182 he was denied the opportunity to read about and partake in a fantasy game that 
might have allowed him to escape—albeit, only in his mind—the misery of life behind 
bars.183 And to the extent that Singer was forced to give up the ninety-six page 
manuscript about D & D that he had drafted,184 the notion of individual self-realization 
through speech185—in this case, creative writing about a game—was thwarted. 
3. Dangerous Newsletters Behind Bars? 
In September 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit186 
applied the Supreme Court’s Turner test to affirm a district court’s order187 allowing the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections to censor the distribution behind bars of an 
erstwhile newsletter called The New Abolitionist, which focused on the Wisconsin state 
prison system. A large part of the dispute in this consolidated case focused on the 
argument of Frank Van den Bosch, the publisher of The New Abolitionist and the member 
of a group called Wisconsin Prison Watch,188 that censorship of the March 2007 issue of 
his newsletter “was not rationally related to security concerns, but rather motivated by a 
desire to suppress any speech critical of the prison administration and the conditions of 
confinement within Wisconsin prisons.”189 In contrast, prison officials contended the 
“newsletter contain[ed] misleading information, encourage[d] distrust of prison staff, and 
could potentially undermine the prison’s rehabilitative initiatives.”190 
Three of the articles in that issue which drew the wrath of prison officials were 
written by inmates, and two of those articles were highly critical of specific aspects of the 
prison system, including the Wisconsin Parole Commission and Program Review 
Committee.191 The third inmate-written article dealt with inmate-initiated litigation in the 
Seventh Circuit, and it “suggested that prisoners erroneously rely upon courts to seek 
social change, and urged readers to ‘employ any and all means necessary, including mass 
protests in front of prisons, in order to ‘bring some attention to this madness they call 
                                                
182 See Madison / DD Game Is Still Banned in Prison, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Jan. 25, 2010, 
(describing Singer as a “convicted killer” who was “sentenced to life in prison in 2002 after he was 
convicted of bludgeoning his sister's boyfriend to death with a sledgehammer”). 
183 The authors are not asserting here that inmates have the right to live in a happy, fun, or pleasant 
environment, but rather that speech and expression provide basic mechanisms for mitigating, even if only 
momentarily, the ills of prison with liberating thoughts and flights of imagination. Cf. Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (observing that “First Amendment freedoms are most in danger 
when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to 
think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the 
beginning of thought”). 
184 See supra note 151 and accompanying text (referencing this manuscript).  
185 See Eberle, supra note 95 (addressing the theory of self-realization through speech). 
186 Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 2011). 
187 Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, No. 09-cv-62-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111196 (W.D. Wisc. Dec. 1, 
2009). 
188 See George Hesselberg, Charges on Record for One, Not for Other, WISC. STATE J., Oct. 5, 2008, at D1 
(identifying Van den Bosch as with Wisconsin Prison Watch). 
189 Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *17. 
190 Id. at *23. 
191 Id. at *4–5. 
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prison life.’”192 Finally, a fourth article written by Van den Bosch allegedly contained 
inaccurate information about the availability of inmate jobs at the Wisconsin Secure 
Program Facility.193 
As with the Singer case described above,194 all it took for the Seventh Circuit to 
uphold the censorship was a lone affidavit from a supposed expert prison official. In this 
case, it was the affidavit of Dan Westfield, security chief of Wisconsin’s Department of 
Corrections Division of Adult Institutions, that set forth boilerplate reasons justifying the 
censorship the Seventh Circuit upheld.195 Despite noting that that Westfield’s affidavit 
was “arguably vague in certain respects”—much like the Tenth Circuit in Sperry openly 
admitting the affidavit of the pivotal prison official in that case was “very 
conclusory”196—the Seventh Circuit wrote that “prisons maintain broad discretion in 
prohibiting material in prison that potentially endangers institutional security.”197 
Through this deferential lens, it ruled that Westfield’s vague affidavit did “identify 
several passages in the March 2007 newsletter that may reasonably encourage distrust of 
prison staff and threaten prison security. Plaintiff’s disagreement with defendant 
Westfield’s assessment is insufficient to establish that confiscation of the newsletter was 
not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”198 
The phrase “several passages” is emphasized above because it demonstrates how, 
unlike in the context of obscenity199 where a work must be considered as a whole before 
it is deemed to fall outside the scope of constitutional protection,200 courts like the 
Seventh Circuit support censoring an entire issue of a newsletter merely because “several 
passages”201 allegedly might lead to distrust of prison staff and threaten prison security. 
This too is indicative of the type of judicial deference accorded to prison officials— 
deference that deviates from the Supreme Court’s maxim in obscenity law that “the First 
Amendment requires that redeeming value be judged by considering the work as a 
whole.”202  
Perhaps even more relevant within the context of the newsletter in Van den Bosch, 
Judge Robert D. Sack notes in the latest edition of his treatise on defamation that “a court 
will not isolate particular phrases and determine whether, considered alone, they are 
                                                
192 Id. at *5.  
193 Id. at *4.  
194 Subpart II.A.2. 
195 Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *21 (observing that the defendants relied “almost 
exclusively on the affidavit of defendant Westfield”). 
196 Sperry v. Werholtz, 413 Fed. Appx. 31, 39 n.4. (10th Cir. 2011); see also subpart II.A.1. 
197 Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *25. 
198 Id. (emphasis added). 
199 Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (writing that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech or press”). 
200 In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that when 
determining whether material is obscene, jurors and judges must consider: 1) whether the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to a 
prurient interest; 2) whether it depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and 3) whether, taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
201 Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *25. 
202 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002). 
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defamatory. The rule that words are to be read in the context of the communication as a 
whole applies to books and broadcasts, as well as to letters and newspaper and periodical 
articles and advertisements.”203 When it comes to interpreting works read by inmates, 
however, such an article-as-a-whole requirement for interpreting a message’s meaning in 
newsletter is jettisoned. Meaning is instead construed from the biased perspective of 
prison officials based on a few isolated passages. 
First Amendment scholars will note that this logic comports with the deference 
given to public school officials in interpreting meaning in student-written messages. In 
particular, in its 2007 Morse v. Frederick204 opinion, the United States Supreme Court 
was highly deferential to principal Deborah Morse’s interpretation of the meaning of the 
obtuse declaration “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”205 Although the Morse majority acknowledged 
the phrase was “cryptic”206 and “probably means nothing at all”207 to some people, it 
nonetheless accepted Deborah Morse’s conclusion that “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” would be 
interpreted by viewers as promoting illegal drug use, calling such an interpretation 
“plainly a reasonable one.”208  
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Justice John Paul Stevens blasted the deference provided by the majority on the 
meaning/interpretation issue. “[I]t is one thing to restrict speech that advocates drug use. 
It is another thing entirely to prohibit an obscure message with a drug theme that a third 
party subjectively—and not very reasonably—thinks is tantamount to express 
advocacy,”209 Stevens opined. He dubbed the majority’s approach to meaning 
“indefensible,”210 criticizing it for “deferring to the principal's ‘reasonable’ judgment that 
Frederick’s sign qualified as drug advocacy.”211 
Ultimately, this deferral to the judgment of government administrators who run 
prisons and public schools on the question of meaning represents another dimension of 
the institutional deference that cuts across the penal and educational systems.212 
                                                
203 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2:4.2 (4th ed. 
2011) (emphasis added). 
204 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
205 Id. at 397 (noting that student Joseph Frederick “and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the 
phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS’” as the Olympic Torch Relay passed by Frederick’s school, Juneau-
Douglas High School, on January 24, 2002). 
206 Id. at 401.  
207 Id.  
208 Id.  
209 Id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
210 Id. at 441.  
211 Id.  
212 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (noting the similarities between how prisoners and public 
school students are treated under the law with regard to speech rights); see also Scott Moss, Students and 
Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First 
Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1639 (2007) (observing that “[c]ourts allow plaintiffs’ 
speech within certain institutions—public schools, workplaces, and prisons—to be heavily restricted 
because it occurs within that institution,” and adding that “in these three contexts, it is courts’ extreme 
institutional tailoring that yields underprotection”). 
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4. Protecting the Right to Receive a Magazine About the Prison System  
While the Seventh Circuit spent September 2011 upholding the censorship of a 
newsletter critical of the Wisconsin penal system in Van den Bosch, the Ninth Circuit that 
same month denied a petition for rehearing en banc in Hrdlicka v. Reniff213 involving 
another prison-centric publication, namely Crime, Justice & America (CJA) magazine. 
Hrdlicka, in fact, marks a relatively rare free-speech triumph under the Turner standard, 
as the Ninth Circuit reversed two grants of summary judgment214 in favor of the 
government officials in charge of the jails in both Butte County, California, and 
Sacramento County, California, who refused to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to 
inmates.215 
Just what type of magazine is CJA and who is its publisher, Ray Hrdlicka? The 
magazine boasts on its website that it promises to: 
inform, explain, entertain, interpret, uncover, and question the relevant 
issues in the criminal justice system: local, regional, and nationwide. 
Specialized demographic sections will reach all people involved in the 
criminal justice system: new arrestees, attorneys, law enforcement, 
judiciary, court personnel, sentenced prisoners, survivors and victims, 
friends and family on both sides of the law.216 
Publisher Ray Hrdlicka, a Chicago native, holds a private investigator’s license and 
has worked as a repo man,217 a bounty hunter, and in the bail-bond business, the last of 
which reaped $30 million annually by 2001 for Hrdlicka but later went bankrupt.218 
According to a 2005 profile in California’s East Bay Express, Hrdlicka started CJA in 
May 2002 and, by 2005, it was “distributed in 31 California counties, with special 
editions for large counties like Los Angeles and for regional groups of smaller ones.”219 
In a precursor to the legal disputes that later would come before the Ninth Circuit in 
Hrdlicka v. Reniff, however, jail authorities in Sonoma County, California in February 
                                                
213 Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18218 (9th Cir. 
Sept. 1, 2011). 
214 See Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Reniff, 2:08-cv-343-GEB-EFB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21976 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (involving the refusal to distribute CJA to inmates at the Butte County Jail, and 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Perry Reniff, the Butte County sheriff); Crime, Justice & 
America, Inc. v. McGuiness, No. Civ. 08-cv-00394 FCD EFB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67054 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 3, 2009) (involving the refusal to distribute CJA to inmates at the Sacramento County Jail and 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant John McGinness, the Sacramento County sheriff and the 
individual in charge of managing the Sacramento County Jail).  
215 Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1046.  
216 Mission Statement, CRIME, JUSTICE & AMERICA, http://crimejusticeandamerica.com/mission-statements 
(last visited May 8, 2012). 
217 See Roman Gokhman, Now Hiring: Ringmaster of Crime, Justice Media, INSIDE BAY AREA (Cal.), Sept. 
6, 2006 (reporting that Hrdlicka “worked as a bounty hunter and for 14 years he ran the largest bail bond 
business in the country,” and that “he began the climb up the ladder of non-government justice at 22 as a 
repo man working for a private investigator”).  
218 Stefanie Kalem, Publisher for Perpetrators, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Cal.) (Sept. 28, 2005), 
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/ebx/publisher-for-the-perpetrators/Content?oid=1079167. 
219 Id.  
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2004 “refused to distribute the magazine after concluding its articles were too 
provocative.”220 
Ray Hrdlicka’s 2011 battle before the Ninth Circuit involved his inability to 
distribute unsolicited copies of CJA at the jails in both Butte County and Sacramento 
County.221 In ruling in favor of Hrdlicka in January 2011, a two-judge majority of the 
Ninth Circuit initially rejected a rather sweeping, categorical assertion by the 
defendants—that “the First Amendment does not protect distribution of a publication to 
inmates who have not requested it.”222 In doing so, the majority initially held that 
publishers—not simply inmates—have a First Amendment interest at stake and that this 
interest “does not depend on a recipient’s prior request for that information.”223 The 
majority derived this latter conclusion from cases in non-prison settings that involved 
restrictions on unsolicited leafleting and handbilling, and it found “no reason why this 
well-established principle does not apply to a publisher’s interest in distributing, and an 
inmate’s corresponding interest in receiving, unsolicited literature.”224  
In stark contrast, however, Judge N. Randy Smith filed a lone dissent that accepted 
the defendants’ blanket assertion that there is no First Amendment right to distribute 
unsolicited publications of any kind behind bars.225 “[T]he simpler and saner rule,” Judge 
Smith opined, “is that Hrdlicka has no special First Amendment right to demand that a 
prison agree to one of his distribution methods. A prison is not a public forum, and a ban 
on unrequested publications is a content neutral method for sheriffs to ensure efficient 
administration of their facilities.”226 Smith, a former Idaho state judge and a former Idaho 
chairman of the Republican Party who was appointed to the Ninth Circuit by President 
George W. Bush,227 derisively characterized Hdrlicka as “asking the court to create a 
special rule, under the First Amendment”228 and concluded that “Hrdlicka does not have 
a special First Amendment right to demand distribution in prisons.”229 The majority 
rebutted the notion that Ray Hrdlicka was asking for something “special” with regard to 
unsolicited distribution of his magazine by asserting that Hrdlicka’s First Amendment 
                                                
220 Id.  
221 Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18218 (9th. Cir. Sept. 1, 2011). 
222 Id. at 1048.  
223 Id. at 1049. 
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 1055–58 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
226 Id. at 1057–58.  
227 See Peter Blumberg, Why Aren’t They Asked?, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 2006, at Forum E1 (writing 
that “unlike other Bush appointees who have provoked a political firestorm because of their records on 
touchy issues, nominees Sandra Ikuta and Milan Smith, both Los Angeles lawyers, and Idaho state Judge 
N. Randy Smith were deemed so uncontroversial that senators didn't ask them much of anything”); 
Judiciary Committee Backs Idahoan for Ninth Circuit, Senator Dianne Feinstein Threatens Filibuster, 
METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE (Cal.), Sept. 22, 2006 (describing Smith as “a former Idaho chairman of 
the Republican Party”). 
228 Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1056 (emphasis added). 
229 Id. at 1058 (emphasis added). 
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argument should be treated under the traditional Turner test and that the unsolicited 
nature of distribution was simply a factor to be considered under Turner.230  
After rejecting the defendants’ blanket assertion that there is no First Amendment 
right to distribute unsolicited publications of any kind behind bars, the two-judge 
majority turned its attention to the more narrow issue of the constitutionality under 
Turner of the ban on unsolicited copies of CJA in the Butte County and Sacramento 
County jails. The majority called the first of the Turner quartet of reasonable factors the 
sine qua non—the essential or critical factor which, if not satisfied, ends the inquiry 
without the court needing to consider the other three Turner factors.231  
B. Federal District Court Opinions 
1. No “R” Rated Movies for Inmates 
In Avila v. Cate,232 a federal district court considered an inmate’s First Amendment 
challenge to a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) policy233 
prohibiting the showing behind bars of any and all movies rated “higher” than PG-13, 
namely those carrying R234 and NC-17235 designations.236 The policy was implemented 
                                                
230 See id. at 1051 (opining that “[t]he fact that in this case the publication was unsolicited may, of course, 
be taken into account in applying the Turner test. But the fact that the publication was unsolicited does not 
make the Turner test inapplicable”). 
231 Id. at 1051.  
232 Avila v. Cate, No. 1:10-cv-01208 JLT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2011). 
233 The policy provides, in relevant part: 
Only those movies/videos which have been given a rating of “G,” “PG,” or “PG-13” by the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) or that have been placed on the department’s 
discretionary showing list may be considered for viewing. Movies/videos which have been given a 
rating of other than “G,” “PG,” or “PG-13” by the Motion Picture Association of America shall 
not be approved for general inmate viewing. Regardless of their rating or listing, movies/videos 
which, in the opinion of the reviewer, glorify violence or sex, or are inflammatory to the climate 
of the facility shall not be shown. 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3220.4(b) (2011). 
234 The Motion Picture Association of America defines an “R” rated movie as one that: 
contains some adult material. An R-rated motion picture may include adult themes, adult activity, 
hard language, intense or persistent violence, sexually-oriented nudity, drug abuse or other 
elements, so that parents are counseled to take this rating very seriously. Children under 17 are not 
allowed to attend R-rated motion pictures unaccompanied by a parent or adult guardian. Parents 
are strongly urged to find out more about R-rated motion pictures in determining their suitability 
for their children. Generally, it is not appropriate for parents to bring their young children with 
them to R-rated motion pictures. 
What Each Rating Means, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 
http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/what-each-rating-means (last visited May 8, 2012). 
235 The Motion Picture Association of America defines an “NC-17” rated movie as one that: 
most parents would consider patently too adult for their children 17 and under. No children will be 
admitted. NC-17 does not mean “obscene” or “pornographic” in the common or legal meaning of 
those words, and should not be construed as a negative judgment in any sense. The rating simply 
signals that the content is appropriate only for an adult audience. An NC-17 rating can be based on 
violence, sex, aberrational behavior, drug abuse or any other element that most parents would 
consider too strong and therefore off-limits for viewing by their children. 
Id.  
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for security reasons and intended to prevent the presentation of movies that “glorify sex 
or violence or inflame the prison population.”237 To further this interest, the policy 
adopted the Motion Picture Association of American (MPAA) rating system, which is a 
voluntary—rather than government imposed—rating system used by the motion picture 
industry in the United States.238  
Inmate Perry Robert Avila, however, argued that the MPAA rating system was 
devised to provide “parents with warnings about what movies they should and should not 
permit their children to see,”239 not for guiding prison officials’ decisions about content 
that incarcerated adults may watch. Indeed, the MPAA’s website states that its rating 
system “endures and evolves as a useful and valued tool for parents and an essential 
guardian of Americans’ freedom of artistic, creative and political expression.”240 Richard 
Mosk, former chairman of the MPAA’s Classification and Rating Administration, made 
this point clear in a 1997 article, writing that “[t]he voluntary system of rating motion 
pictures for the benefit of American parents has become a widely used component of the 
American movie scene.”241 
Furthermore, it is well established that governmental entities may not adopt 
voluntary rating systems created by private agencies in order to censor media content.242 
Such implementation constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of government authority 
to a private entity.243 Attorney Colin Miller emphasized this point in a law journal article, 
asserting that if courts “allow governmental agencies to rely upon MPAA ratings when 
censoring films, courts will be giving too much power to the MPAA, a private 
organization, to inform government censorship decisions based on nebulous standards. 
This use was not historically intended by the MPAA and is not justified.”244 Inmate Avila 
                                                                                                                                            
236 Avila, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809, at *14 (writing that “[p]laintiff challenges the complete ban on 
movies rated ‘higher’ than PG-13”). 
237 Id. at *12. 
238 Id. at *3–4. 
239 Id. at *4. 
240 Ratings History: Safeguarding Artistic Freedom, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 
http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/ratings-history (last visited May 8, 2012) (emphasis added). 
241 Richard M. Mosk, Motion Picture Ratings in the United States, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 135 
(1997) (emphasis added). 
242 See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (D. Minn. 2006), aff’d, 519 F.3d 768 
(8th Cir. 2008) (involving the adoption by the state of Minnesota of the voluntary rating system for video 
games developed by the Entertainment Software Rating Board, and holding that “such a delegation of 
authority, whether the penalty for violation of the Act be civil or criminal, violates the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and renders the Act unconstitutional”); Engdahl v. City of Kenosha, 317 F. Supp. 1133, 
1135–36 (E.D. Wisc. 1970) (holding that it was improper for a state to delegate to the MPAA and its rating 
system the authority to determine whether movies are proper for minors). 
243 As one federal court wrote in considering the adoption by Minnesota of the voluntary rating system for 
video games developed by the Entertainment Software Rating Board: 
The Court finds the Act’s delegation of authority to the ESRB to determine those video games 
which a child under 17 years of age may rent or purchase is improper. The ESRB rating is 
determined by a private body with no duty to answer to the public. Indeed, the rating scheme does 
not provide a method for the public or the State to challenge a rating once it is determined; only 
video game publishers are given that right. 
Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
244 Colin Miller, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Wolf v. Ashcroft and the Constitutionality of Using the 
MPAA Ratings to Censor Films in Prison, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 265, 283 (2004). 
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thus argued both that the CDCR “ceded governmental authority over prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights to the MPAA”245 and that the policy banning any and all movies rated 
higher than PG-13 was overbroad.246  
Despite these facts and opinions, in July 2011, however, United States Magistrate 
Judge Jennifer Thurston applied Turner247 and concluded that the CDCR’s “reliance on 
the MPAA system is reasonable even though it may exclude movies that do not further 
penological goals”248 and that the regulation was “reasonable and, while overbroad in 
some respects, not unconstitutional. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 
First Amendment claim against any of the defendants.”249 
Both of the statements quoted immediately above illustrate the vast deference 
accorded to prison officials: 1) it was perfectly acceptable that the policy excludes some 
movies that do not further any penological goals; and 2) it was fine that the policy was 
“overbroad in some respects.”250 Magistrate Thurston acknowledged “that the R- and the 
NC-17 ratings, may be assigned to movies that contain no violence or sexuality,”251 but 
she concluded that “the breadth of the regulation does not render it constitutionally 
infirm.”252 Apparently there also is a key difference between the print medium and 
motion pictures for inmates behind bars. In considering the second Turner factor, 
Magistrate Thurston mixed media, as it were. She asserted that printed material featuring 
the same content that the MPAA might consider to be R or NC-17 rated would be 
allowed behind bars and constitute an appropriate alternative means for a prisoner to 
exercise his First Amendment right to receive speech.253 In brief, written descriptions 
constitute a suitable substitute for visual images and motion pictures. 
Ultimately, Magistrate Thurston’s conclusion in Avila is consistent with that of a 
federal district court in Pennsylvania, which held in 2006 under Turner that inmates “do 
not have a First Amendment right to R-rated movies per se. Instead, Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment right, most narrowly defined, is the right to receive information and ideas 
through a broad range of movies.”254 The decision in Avila also comports with a 
Massachusetts federal district court opinion from 2008 that employed a Turner analysis 
to uphold a ban on movies rated R, X, and NC-17 by the MPAA.255 
The bottom line is that when it comes to the right to view movies behind bars, at 
least three courts now allow prison officials to implement the MPAA rating system, 
despite its vague nature and the fact that it broadly sweeps up movies, particularly those 
in the R category, that may not serve any legitimate penological interests in safety, 
security, or rehabilitation. Furthermore, a policy that was designed to help parents to 
                                                
245 Avila, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809, at *15. 
246 See id. at *14 (writing that “the focus of Plaintiff[’s] challenge is his claim that the regulation is 
overbroad”). 
247 See id. at **9–30 (applying the quartet of Turner factors). 
248 Id. at *24. 
249 Id. at *30. 
250 Id.  
251 Id. at *16. 
252 Id. at *17. 
253 Id. at **25–26. 
254 Jewell v. Gonzales, 420 F. Supp. 2d 406, 438 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
255 Gaskins v. Clarke, No. 07-10084-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3150, at **6–7 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2008). 
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protect their children256 has been turned into a tool of censorship to be used and abused 
by prison officials. It seemingly makes little difference to courts that the delegation of 
government responsibility to create a rating system to a private entity—the MPAA—
conflicts with the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation.257 
Finally, it is worth noting the parallel here again between the rights of public school 
students and prisoners. In particular, a federal district court in 1995 upheld a public 
school district’s reliance on the MPAA rating system “as a filter of films.”258 In Borger, 
as in Avila, movies rated R were considered forbidden fruit,259 with United States District 
Judge John W. Reynolds reasoning that “[a]n R-rating indicates that reasonable people 
could determine that high school students should not view the film”260 and concluding 
that “‘reasonableness’ is all that is necessary in a high school setting. This is a 
constitutional exercise of school board discretion.”261 
2. Dangerous Pressure Points of Censorship? 
The 2010 federal district court ruling in Starr v. Moore262 pivoted on inmate Darren 
Starr’s desire to read two books about acupuncture and qi,263 Fundamentals of Chinese 
Acupuncture264 and The Color Atlas of Acupuncture, while incarcerated at the Northern 
New Hampshire Correctional Facility.265 The tomes were mailed to Starr in prison 
directly from their respective publishers, in compliance with the prison’s media policy.266 
                                                
256 See supra notes 240–241 (describing the original purpose of the MPAA rating system).  
257 See supra notes 242–244 (addressing the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of authority).  
258 Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Wisc. 1995).  
259 See id. at 101 (noting that “‘R’ ratings are the threshold which the School Board has chosen as movies 
that will not even be considered”). 
260 Id.  
261 Id.  
262 Starr v. Moore, No. 09-cv-440-JL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85426, at **4–5 (D. N.H. July 27, 2010), 
approved, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85025 (D. N.H. Aug. 18, 2010). 
263 Qi, according to the court, “is a life force or vital energy believed by some to circulate through the 
body,” while acupuncture “is based on the principle that the unimpeded and balanced circulation of qi 
through pathways in the body is essential to good health.” Id. at **3–4. 
264 ANDREW ELLIS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CHINESE ACUPUNCTURE (Paradigm Publications Rev. Ed. 
1991). The publisher of the book describes it as: 
one of the most-used acupuncture books in the profession. Perhaps first and foremost it is because 
the authors have applied a precise method of translation that allows clinical experience to be 
directly transmitted. As well, they have drawn on both modern and classical clinical sources. Thus 
the text provides consistent information that can be cross-referenced not only to the several 
companion works but to any translation that maintains a reliable relation to the Chinese language. 
The information presented includes all the channels, including the extraordinary channels, the 
main, internal, branch, divergent, connecting, sinew, and alternate pathways as they are currently 
understood in the People’s Republic of China. 
Fundamentals of Chinese Acupuncture, PARADIGM PUBLICATIONS, http://www.paradigm-
pubs.com/catalog/detail/FunChiAcu (last visited May 8, 2012). 
265 HANS ULRICH-HECKER ET AL., THE COLOR ATLAS OF ACUPUNCTURE: BODY POINTS—EAR POINTS—
TRIGGER POINTS (2d ed. 2008). According to a description of The Color Atlas of Acupuncture on the 
publisher’s website, the book is “a flexi textbook that contains information on all the major body and ear 
acupuncture points, as well as an extensive coverage of trigger points. The text is augmented by 126 
illustrations pertaining to body acupuncture, 48 illustrations on ear acupuncture, and 114 illustrations on 
trigger points.” The Color Atlas of Acupuncture, THIEME MEDICAL PUBLISHERS, 
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When the books arrived, a mailroom officer initially approved their delivery to 
Starr,267 but a corrections officer later questioned their suitability and returned them to the 
mailroom officer, asking that they be examined by the New Hampshire Department of 
Corrections’s (NHDOC) Library Review Committee (LRC).268 The LRC, which is 
comprised of NHDOC staff members in the areas of security, education, and mental 
health, denied delivery because the books allegedly would “encourage physical 
violence.”269  
Starr appealed to prison officials, asserting the pair of books actually promote 
health and healing and “in no way instruct readers in or encourage the use of violence.”270 
In a preemptive strike against potential LRC arguments about their anatomical content, 
Starr contended that “the prison already allows inmates to receive books about human 
anatomy.”271 
The corrections officer responding to Starr’s grievance at the first level of review 
stated that he was not so much worried about the anatomical depictions as he was with 
the “fact that the book specifically discusses and depicts vital pressure points and nerve 
bundles in the human body, and that if such information was misused by an inmate, the 
result could be permanent injury or death to another person.”272 Prison officials further 
asserted “this information could be misused and cause a breach of safety and security 
within the prison.”273 Put more bluntly, the assumption of officials was that a little bit of 
knowledge about bodily pressure points is a dangerous thing because prisoners will use 
and abuse it to kill others. Two other officers affirmed these safety justifications in their 
respective responses to Starr’s second and third grievance filings,274 ultimately sparking 
the lawsuit. 
United States Magistrate Judge Landya B. McCafferty applied the four Turner 
factors.275 In another stunning display of deference to prison officials, Magistrate 
McCafferty determined that “the prison’s concerns are reasonable and legitimate, and as 
such, may provide the basis for the regulation and restriction of incoming reading 
materials at the prison.”276 She reasoned “the prison took a measured and reasonable 
approach to the possibility of introducing materials into the prison and found through that 
process that the information in the books has the potential for enabling serious or deadly 
consequences if misused.”277  
Magistrate McCafferty acknowledged the deference she provided prison officials, 
writing that a “[c]ourt must accord prison administrators significant deference in defining 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.thieme.com/index.php?page=shop.product_details&flypage=flypage.tpl&product_id=675&cate
gory_id=8&option=com_virtuemart&Itemid=53 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).  
266 Starr, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85426, at *4. 
267 Id. at *4. 
268 Id.  
269 Id. at *5.  
270 Id.  
271 Id. at *6. 
272 Id. at *10. 
273 Id.  
274 Id. at *5. 
275 Id. at *3.  
276 Id. at *11. 
277 Id. at *12. 
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legitimate goals for the corrections system, and for determining the best means of 
accomplishing those goals.”278 Notably, the Starr opinion is devoid of any factual 
evidence or testimony that either of the two books ever has been used—whether by 
people behind bars or otherwise—to cause the types of harms prison officials conjured 
up. Mere speculation and supposition was all that was needed to suppress two books that 
neither endorse nor condone violence. Likewise, there was no evidence that either book 
provided either a roadmap or set of instructions for how to commit violent acts. The Starr 
opinion thus represents the application of a toothless Turner test. 
3. White Supremacist Magazines & Sexually Graphic Comics 
In April 2011, in Miskam v. McAllister,279 United States District Judge J. Michael 
Seabright rejected an inmate’s First Amendment-based challenge to prison officials’ 
refusal to allow him to possess copies of the white-supremacist magazine Resistance280 
and the sexually graphic comic book Satan’s Sodomy Baby.281 While housed at 
California’s High Desert State Prison (HDSP), Travis George Miskam was denied access 
to the former publication under a state regulation that prohibits inmates from possessing 
“[a]ny matter of a character tending to incite murder; arson; riot; or any form of violence 
or physical harm to any person, or any ethnic, gender, racial, religious, or other group.”282 
Access to the latter publication was blocked at HDSP under California regulations 
prohibiting the possession of both “[o]bscene” content283 and “[s]exually explicit images 
that depict frontal nudity in the form of personal photographs, drawings, magazines, or 
other pictorial format.”284 
Inmate Miskam raised an “as-applied challenge that the denial of these publications 
pursuant to these provisions was not reasonably related to penological interests.”285 Not 
surprisingly, given its adoption in all of the other recent cases examined in this Article, 
Judge Seabright applied Turner and its quartet of factors to analyze this issue, calling the 
test a “deferential”286 one under which inmates face a “heavy burden.”287 
Indeed, the burden proved too heavy for Miskam to meet, with Judge Seabright 
finding a logical relationship between censoring the white supremacist magazine 
                                                
278 Id. at **12–13.  
279 Miskam v. McAllister, No. 2:08-02229 JMS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011). 
280 Judge Seabright described Resistance as “a magazine directed to white supremacists” that “supports 
violence against non-white races.” Id. at *5. For instance, the judge quoted one article in an issue of the 
magazine to which inmate Miskam was denied access at HDSP as calling on readers to “[s]top the bullshit, 
get off your asses, and Unite & Fight! If only one kid wakes up and starts fighting for his race, then I feel 
it’s worth it.” Id. The magazine invoked invectives against both blacks and Jews. Id. at *4–5.  
281 One prison official filed a declaration stating that this comic book “vividly depicts, displays and 
describes penetration of the anus and contact between the genitals and mouth[, and] that throughout the 
comic were descriptions of sexual acts and exhibitions of frontal nudity of the male and female breasts and 
genitals.” Id. at *5–6.  
282 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3006(c)(1) (2011).  
283 § 3006(c)(15).  
284 § 3006(c)(15).  
285 Miskam, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *14. 
286 Id. at *15. 
287 Id.  
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Resistance and the penological interests in safety and security.288 The judge cited as 
support for this conclusion the declaration of a prison official that “[i]n the five years 
prior to the denial of Resistance, there were fifteen recorded incidents of lockdown at 
HDSP as a result of racial tension.”289 The logic adopted by Judge Seabright for how 
possession of Resistance would cause future violence behind bars went as follows: 
Given the history of racially motivated violence at HDSP and Resistance’s 
racially inflammatory theme, other prisoners could certainly observe the 
racially based materials in Plaintiff’s possession, draw conclusions about 
his beliefs and affiliations, and further the racial tension and violence. 
Violence, of course, would also jeopardize safety of correctional officers 
charged with maintaining the peace at HDSP.290 
The fact that there was absolutely no evidence demonstrating that possession of 
Resistance had caused any violence behind bars simply was not relevant, according to 
Judge Seabright.291 The judge wrote, “a prison need not show that a banned publication 
actually caused conflict; the focus is instead on whether the ban is reasonably related to a 
penological interest.”292 
First Amendment scholars familiar with the realm of student speech issues will 
quickly recognize the parallel between Judge Seabright’s use of past racial violence in the 
prison context to justify squelching possession of a white supremacist magazine and 
school officials’ use of past racial tension and violence in on-campus educational settings 
to justify squelching the display of the confederate flag.293 As one federal appellate court 
recently wrote, “a school may reasonably forecast that the Confederate flag would cause 
substantial and material disruption of a school when the school had recently experienced 
                                                
288 Id. at **16–17.  
289 Id. at *17. 
290 Id. at *19. 
291 Id. at *20. 
292 Id. at *20. 
293 See A.M. v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[o]ther circuits, applying Tinker, have 
held that administrators may prohibit the display of the Confederate flag in light of racial hostility and 
tension at their schools”); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009) (writing 
that “Tinker and its progeny allow a school to ‘forecast’ a disruption and take necessary precautions before 
racial tensions escalate out of hand. As a result of race-related incidents both in and out of the school, the 
administration reasonably denied the display of the Confederate flag within the school,” and adding that 
“[o]ur holding is in line with our sister circuits that have addressed this issue”).  
The reference in both of the above cases to Tinker refers to the United States Supreme Court’s 
seminal student-speech decision. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(providing First Amendment-based speech protection to public school students who wore black armbands 
affixed with peace signs to their school in order to make a political statement about the war in Vietnam). 
See generally Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed But Still Standing, 58 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1167 (2009) (providing a relatively recent overview of Tinker and its lasting legacy in student-
speech cases).  
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intense racial conflict.”294 This is yet another parallel between the speech rights of public 
school students and inmates noted earlier in this Article.295 
As for Satan’s Sodomy Baby, Judge Seabright relied on a long line of precedent 
from other courts that analyzed and upheld under Turner prison rules prohibiting the 
possession of sexually explicit materials.296 Those cases allow censorship of such 
materials on the grounds that their suppression is reasonably related to goals of prison 
security and inmate rehabilitation.297 
4. Rebuffing the Censorship of Sexually Themed Literature  
As an isolated island of victory encircled by a choppy sea of judicial defeats for 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, Couch v. Jabe298 merits special attention. In 
particular, it provides an important lesson to prison officials about the need to both 
carefully craft speech-based regulations and to enforce them consistently. Furthermore, 
Couch stands out as a case in which a plaintiff-inmate prevailed without attorney 
assistance299 and in which a judge, although acknowledging the very deferential approach 
generally taken under Turner,300 shredded the specious logic of prison officials and 
refused to accede to their tortured reasoning.301 
In Couch, a federal district court in 2010 declared unconstitutional a Virginia 
Department of Corrections (VDOC) policy restricting inmate access to “explicit or 
graphic depictions or descriptions of sexual acts.”302 The policy, prison officials asserted, 
was necessary in order “to provide for the efficient, safe, and secure administration of 
VDOC facilities by limiting materials which might be disruptive in myriad ways” and to 
help with the rehabilitation process of inmates “by limiting materials which might be 
counter-productive.”303 In particular, prison officials claimed that sexual materials: 1) are 
                                                
294 Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 568 (6th Cir. 2008). 
295 Supra notes 62–64, 204–208, 212, 258–261 and accompanying text (referencing the parallels between 
the speech rights of students and inmates).  
296 Miskam, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *22–27. 
297 Id. at *23. 
298 737 F. Supp. 2d 561 (W.D. Va. 2010). 
299 See id. at 562 (noting that inmate William Couch was “proceeding pro se”); see also Peter Vieth, Senior 
U.S. District Judge James C. Turk Rules Virginia Prison Censorship Irrational, VA. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 
13, 2010 (noting that the “opinion marks a win for an inmate who argued, without the assistance of a 
lawyer”).  
300 Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (observing that “[m]any regulations have been approved because the 
application of the Turner factors has always been a very deferential standard”). 
301 See infra notes 307–333 and accompanying text (setting forth Judge James Turk’s analysis in the case). 
302 Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (concluding that the policy was “facially unconstitutional”). The 
provision in question, VDOC Operating Policy 803.2, prohibited the receipt and possession of materials 
containing “[e]xplicit or graphic depictions or descriptions of sexual acts,” and it defined such materials as 
including: 
a. Actual sexual intercourse, normal or perverted, anal, or oral; 
b. Secretion or excretion of bodily fluids or substances in the context of sexual activity; 
c. Lewd exhibitions of uncovered genitals in the context of sexual activity; 
d. Bondage, sadistic, masochistic or other violent acts in the context of sexual activity; [and] 
e. Any sexual acts in violation of state or federal law. 
Id. at 563.  
303 Id. at 564. 
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so valuable behind bars that their possession “may lead to stealing, fights, assaults and 
other disruptive activities;” 2) could lead to violence among inmates who are aroused by 
reading them and seek immediate sexual gratification; and 3) could contribute to the 
sexual harassment of prison staff and create a hostile working environment.304 
William Couch, however, simply wanted to read a couple of books while serving 
multiple life sentences at the Augusta Correctional Center in Craigsville, Virginia, for 
committing a series of rapes and thefts in the early 1990s.305 He filed a civil rights 
claim306 against VDOC officials after two books with what United States District Judge 
James Turk called a “storied, litigious history”—James Joyce’s Ulysses and D. H. 
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover307—were removed from the prison library in 
2009.308 Those tomes have long been targets of censorship in the United States due to 
their sexual content,309 and Judge Turk speculated that Couch might have selected them 
precisely for that reason.310 
Analyzing Couch’s claim, Judge Turk initially observed that although inmates have 
no First Amendment right to “a general purpose reading library,”311 prison officials who 
voluntarily establish such facilities must then play by the same First Amendment rules 
that apply to the removal of books from the shelves of public school libraries.312 Once 
again illustrating the parallel between the rights of prisoners and public school students, 
Judge Turk wrote, “these two classes of individuals are similarly situated for the purposes 
of this analysis.”313 For Judge Turk, the case boiled down to how prison officials 
exercised their discretion when deciding what material to exclude and remove from the 
                                                
304 Id. at 570. 
305 See Couch v. Jabe, No. 5:10-cv-00072, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43356, at *6 (W.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2011) 
(involving a lawsuit by Couch that unsuccessfully challenged a prison policy prohibiting him from growing 
a beard, and “Couch is serving multiple life sentences, plus 37 years, for multiple counts of rape, robbery, 
and statutory burglary”); Mike Gangloff, Judge Backs Inmate on Prison Reading Material Policy, 
ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Sept. 2, 2010, at A7 (noting that Couch “is serving multiple life sentences for a 
string of rapes and thefts in the early 1990s”). 
306 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010).  
307 Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 563 n.2. See generally EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK 
EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS 7–39, 83–97, 338–341 (1992) 
(chronicling the controversies surrounding the publishing and censorship of Ulysses and of Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover).  
308 Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
309 See, e.g., Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) 
(involving the censorship of a motion picture version of Lady Chatterley’s Lover); United States v. One 
Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934) (involving the government seizure 
of Ulysses due to its sexual content, but concluding “that Ulysses is a book of originality and sincerity of 
treatment and that it has not the effect of promoting lust”); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 
488, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (involving censorship of an unexpurgated version of Lady Chatterley’s Lover by 
the Postmaster of New York, and concluding the book was “not obscene within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1461, and is entitled to the protections guaranteed to freedoms of speech and press by the First 
Amendment”). 
310 See Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 563 n.2 (“These two books were, perhaps, chosen by the plaintiff to serve 
as the basis for his complaint because of their storied, litigious history.”). 
311 Id. at 564. 
312 Id. at 565. 
313 Id.  
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library,314 with inmate Couch arguing the policy was unconstitutionally overbroad in 
providing those officials with too much discretion.315 
In addressing this issue, Judge Turk avoided traditional overbreadth criteria316 due 
to the case’s prison setting and, instead, applied Turner’s reasonably-related-to-
legitimate-penological-interests test.317 Although noting that courts often uphold 
regulations banning sexually explicit material under Turner,318 Judge Turk reached the 
opposite conclusion in Couch and remarked that some regulations simply fall “beyond 
the limits of even a deferential application of the Turner standard.”319 
In fact, Judge Turner did not need to venture very far into a Turner analysis before 
enjoining enforcement of the policy, writing that “consideration of just the first and 
fourth Turner factors are more than sufficient to indicate the unconstitutional nature”320 
of the VDOC’s policy on sexually explicit material. As to the first factor—whether a 
rational connection exists between the regulation and a legitimate governmental 
interest—Judge Turk bristled at the fact that VDOC’s policy results in the censorship of 
many great works of literature321 while simultaneously and incongruously permitting 
access to what he dubbed “soft core”322 magazines like Playboy.  
“[I]t is unlikely that a cogent argument could be advanced which would explain 
how a regulation which forbids James Joyce’s Ulysses, but permits Hugh Hefner’s 
Playboy, has a rational relationship to the above-stated goals. Any such argument would 
be irrational, if not utterly incomprehensible,”323 Judge Turk opined. As for the security, 
safety and rehabilitation interests that prison officials asserted to support the ban,324 
Judge Turk wrote: 
                                                
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 See supra note 10 (providing background on traditional overbreadth analysis). 
317 See Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 565–73 (applying Turner to the facts of the case). 
318 See id. at 566 (“These factors have been applied to prison regulations banning sexually explicit material 
many times, and courts have often concluded that the challenged regulations are reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”). 
319 Id.  
320 Id. at 567. 
321 Judge Turk, flashing his own knowledge of literature, wrote that the following books would be 
prohibited under the VDOC policy because they include at least one explicit description of a sexual act or 
intercourse: 
Candide by Voltaire; Brave New World by Aldous Huxley; All the Pretty Horses by Cormac 
McCarthy; Droll Stories by HonorÈ de Balzac; Howl and Other Poems by Allen Ginsburg; [The] 
Naked Lunch by William S. Burroughs; Tropic of Cancer by Henry Miller; Slaughterhouse Five 
by Kurt Vonnegaught; Sophie’s Choice by William Styron; Myra Breckenridge by Gore Vidal; 
One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel Garcia Marquez; For Whom the Bell Tolls by Ernest 
Hemingway; A Farewell to Arms by Ernest Hemingway; Women in Love by D. H. Lawrence; As I 
Lay Dying by William Faulkner; The Handmaid’s Tale by Margaret Atwood; Leaves of Grass and 
Song of Myself by Walt Whitman, as well as nearly any novel by John Updike. 
Id. at 568 n.4 
322 Id. at 571 n. 20. 
323 Id. at 567. 
324 See supra notes 303–304 and accompanying text (setting forth the reasons asserted by prison officials 
for explaining the policy).  
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It strains credulity to believe that limiting a prisoner’s access to Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover could have any effect on the security, discipline, and 
good order of the prison. Likewise, it would be patently incredible to 
assert that reading Joyce’s Ulysses will somehow threaten the 
rehabilitation of a prisoner. Certainly, VDOC has not provided any 
scientific or expert evidence that supports such connections.325 
Judge Turk, in perhaps coming as close as possible to judicial ridicule of a 
government policy without stepping over the line of professionalism, added: 
[I]t is a bizarre interpretation to suggest that an inmate’s possession of 
Ulysses would be used for “bartering” or “lead to stealing, fights, assaults 
and other disruptive activities.” Particularly with respect to Ulysses it is 
impossible to even imagine prison inmates fighting for the chance to delve 
into the incredibly difficult to decipher novel, one metaphor-laden scene 
of which portrays exhibitionist behavior and masturbation.326 
Given such a scathing critique, it was anything but surprising that Judge Turk 
concluded that a policy that fails to “discriminate between works such as James Joyce’s 
Ulysses and common pornography”327—a plan “permitting Playboy and forbidding 
Ulysses”328—simply “does not possess the constitutionally required rational connection 
between regulation and the legitimate governmental objective.”329  
Turning to the fourth Turner factor—consideration of whether an easy or ready 
alternative policy would serve the interest(s) asserted by prison officials without 
intruding as much on First Amendment concerns—Judge Turk suggested that a policy 
banning only visual depictions of frontal nudity and not prohibiting words would be a 
reasonable solution.330 Put differently, an images-versus-words distinction or dichotomy 
might well remedy the over inclusiveness of the existing policy. In fact, Judge Turk 
stayed the injunction for sixty days to provide VDOC officials time to amend or revise 
their policy in such manner to render it constitutional.331 
In summary, the VDOC prohibition on sexually explicit content suffered from what 
Judge Turk dubbed the “fatal flaw of over inclusiveness.”332 The policy’s expansive 
breadth simply undermined the alleged rationales and arguments behind it. Crafting 
precise policies that are more narrowly tailored in scope thus should become a priority for 
prison officials if they want to squelch speech in a constitutional fashion and not receive 
a judicial tongue-lashing. 
With the examination of the eight opinions in this Part of the Article in mind, the 
authors now turn to an issue raised by a very recent United States Supreme Court ruling 
                                                
325 Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 569–70.  
326 Id. at 571. 
327 Id. at 572. 
328 Id.  
329 Id.  
330 Id. at 573. 
331 Id. at 574. 
332 Id. at 568. 
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that arguably could impact the level of proof by which prison officials must demonstrate 
that a speech-related product will cause harm behind bars. 
III. RELAXED STANDARDS OF CAUSATION AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: SHOULD 
BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION AFFECT THE ANALYSIS OF 
CONTENT-BASED, BEHIND-BARS CENSORSHIP? 
In June 2011, the United States Supreme Court struck down a California statute 
designed to shield minors from supposedly dangerous speech, namely violent video 
games in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.333 Writing the Opinion of the 
Court, Justice Antonin Scalia adopted a rigorous standard that requires proof that speech 
must in fact cause harm before it may be censored permissibly.334 Justice Scalia wrote in 
Brown that “ambiguous proof will not suffice” and neither will a mere positive 
correlation between speech and harm.335 As he put it, the studies offered by California in 
Brown “do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively (which 
would at least be a beginning).”336 
Given the consistent parallels drawn between the speech rights of minors in public 
school settings and the speech rights of adults behind bars,337 one might reasonably 
wonder if the ruling in Brown should impact the level of proof that prison officials must 
demonstrate before supposedly harmful speech—books, movies, and magazines—may be 
censored. For instance, in the case of Singer v. Raemisch,338 should prison officials be 
required to prove that either reading about or playing the video game “Dungeons and 
Dragons” causes inmates to act like violent gang members? Further, in the case of Starr 
v. Moore,339 should prison officials be required to prove that reading books about 
acupuncture and qi causes inmates to take the knowledge they gain about body pressure 
points and then use it to commit violent acts against other inmates? It will be recalled, 
however, from Miskam v. McAllister described above340 that the general rule here is that 
“a prison need not show that a banned publication actually caused conflict; the focus is 
instead on whether the ban is reasonably related to a penological interest.”341 
Unfortunately for free speech advocates, it is not likely that Brown’s analysis of the 
proof-of-harm issue will be transported to the realm of prison censorship anytime soon. 
That is because Brown was specifically decided under the strict scrutiny standard of 
judicial review,342 rather than what closely approximates the rational basis standard of 
                                                
333 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (concluding that California’s violent video game law “cannot survive strict 
scrutiny”). 
334 Id. at 2738–39. 
335 Id. at 2739. Justice Scalia wrote that the studies offered by California to support its law “show at best 
some correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects.” Id. 
336 Id.  
337 Supra notes 62–64, 204–208, 212, 258–261 and accompanying text (referencing the parallels between 
the speech rights of students and inmates).  
338 Supra subpart II.A.2.  
339 Supra subpart II.B.2.  
340 Supra subpart II.B.3.  
341 Miskam v. McAllister, No. 2:08-02229 JMS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 
2011). 
342 See text accompanying supra note 7 (describing strict scrutiny review).  
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review in Equal Protection cases not involving either suspect classes or fundamental 
rights343 and that was embraced under Turner in the First Amendment context of inmate 
speech.344 The two tests are radically different, both inside and outside of the First 
Amendment context.345 Significantly, even when the United States Supreme Court 
administers rational basis review in a more demanding, with-teeth fashion, only a 
correlation is required between classification and purpose.346 
Furthermore, under the Turner framework, judicial “deference not only lightens the 
government’s burden of justifying a speech restriction, but actually shifts the burden back 
to the speech plaintiff.”347 On the question of proof of harm allegedly caused by speech, 
this burden shifting has the rather perverse result of requiring an inmate to demonstrate 
lack of causation while assuming that the speech prison officials seek to censor causes 
harm. Put more bluntly, the burden on the plaintiff-inmate is to prove a negative. How a 
plaintiff behind bars might accomplish this task boggles the mind, even if he or she was a 
social scientist capable of designing and performing controlled experiments behind bars. 
Thus, unless the Supreme Court abandons the Turner analysis for a strict scrutiny 
standard of review when the First Amendment speech rights of inmates are restricted by 
content-based regulations on what they may read or watch, it is highly doubtful that the 
causation-of-harm requirements from the 2011 ruling in Brown will be applied in the 
prison context. 
                                                
343 Professors John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda describe rational basis review as: 
the test used in cases that do not involve a fundamental right and wherein the Court does not find a 
classification of persons for whom there should be special protection (such as racial, national 
origin, gender or illegitimacy classifications). The rationality test is easy to state: the classification 
only has to have a rational relationship to any legitimate government interest in order to comply 
with the equal protection guarantee. 
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (8th ed. 2010). 
344 Other legal commentators have drawn the link between rational basis review and the Turner test. See, 
e.g., Rose, supra note 57, at 169–70 (referring to the Turner test as “rational basis review”); Ozan O. Varol, 
Strict in Theory, But Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243, 1284 (2010) (writing that “[u]nder 
Turner, a prison policy that burdened the inmates’ constitutional rights would be upheld if the policy was 
‘reasonably related’ to ‘legitimate penological interests’—similar to rational-basis review) (emphasis 
added). 
345 As Professor Eva S. Nilsen succinctly explains: 
Where other laws invoking mere liberty interests need only be rationally related to any 
conceivable legitimate government purpose to survive a due process challenge (rational basis 
review), strict scrutiny means that once a right is determined to be fundamental, its deprivation 
must be supported by a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly tailored so that no greater 
deprivation is inflicted than is necessary to achieve that interest. 
Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional 
Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 170 (2007) (emphasis added). 
346 Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. 
L. REV. 281, 290 (2011) (writing that “in those rationality cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has applied 
a more demanding standard, it will typically search the record for evidence of a correlation between 
classification and purpose, and it will also insist that there actually be such a correlation”) (emphasis 
added). 
347 See Moss, supra note 212, at 1659 (emphasis added). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky characterizes the United States Supreme Court as 
affording “tremendous deference”348 to the government in the area of prison 
administration. Deference, as Professor Paul Horwitz writes, may be defined as “a 
decisionmaker’s decision to follow a determination made by some other individual or 
institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question 
independently.”349 Specifically, in cases involving the free speech rights of prisoners, as 
with those of students in public school settings, courts engage in what is known as 
institutional deference.350 In brief, they defer to the supposedly specialized knowledge 
and expertise of those who operate such government institutions.351 
The damage wrought to free speech rights by such institutional deference is 
compounded by real-world fears and cultural pressures. In particular, just as fears of 
future Columbine-like violence have left high school students swimming in a sea of 
censorship as judges provide massive deference to school administrators,352 fears of 
violence and disruption of security within prisons largely fuel the deference granted to 
prison officials by lower court judges. This, in turn, typically renders Turner toothless 
when it comes to protecting the First Amendment speech rights of inmates. Perhaps this 
is why the type of rigorous application of Turner witnessed in the dissenting opinions of 
both Justice John Paul Stevens353 and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg354 in the Supreme 
Court’s 2006 opinion in Beard v. Banks355 was evidenced only in two of the eight cases 
from 2010 and 2011 examined above, namely the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Hrdlicka v. 
                                                
348 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 453 
(1999).  
349 Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2008). 
350 See Moss, supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting the similarities between how prisoners and 
public school students are treated under the law when it comes to free speech rights). 
351 Professor Gia B. Lee makes this point in a recent law journal article: 
A common set of arguments advanced to justify courts’ limited review of speech restrictions 
within government institutions or programs stresses the initial decisionmaker’s superior 
knowledge or judgment in a particular field. On this view, executive and administrative officials 
such as school administrators, prison wardens, and military officials have the relevant experience 
and expertise to reach decisions that ensure well-functioning institutions. 
Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1691, 1718 (2009). 
352 The specter of violence like the kind caused by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold in April 1999 at 
Columbine High School is still evident in judicial decisions more than a decade after that tragedy. See, e.g., 
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756, 764, (8th Cir. 2011) (involving a student, 
D.J.M., who “sent instant messages from his home to a classmate in which he talked about getting a gun 
and shooting some other students at school,” and concluding that “[i]n light of [a school district]’s 
obligation to ensure the safety of its students and reasonable concerns created by shooting deaths at other 
schools such as Columbine,” the trial court correctly ruled that the school district “did not violate the First 
Amendment by notifying the police about [student] D.J.M.’s threatening instant messages and subsequently 
suspending him after he was placed in juvenile detention”) (emphasis added). 
353 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 542–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
354 Id. at 553–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
355 548 U.S. 521 (2006); see supra Part I (examining the high court’s ruling in Beard). 
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Reniff356 and the decision by United States District Judge James Turk out of the Western 
District of Virginia in Couch v. Jabe.357 
Though it often is rendered toothless when applied by federal appellate and district 
court judges,358 this Article makes it clear that Turner certainly is the judicial standard of 
choice twenty-five years after it was handed down. The Eighth Amendment standard of 
review championed by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia was adopted in 
none of the 2010 and 2011 federal court cases involving the access-to-speech rights of 
inmates.359  
The bottom line is that unless an inmate’s case involves particularly outrageous 
facts or happens to be assigned to a pro-free speech jurist who refuses to grant expansive 
deference to prison officials, there is very little hope of a First Amendment triumph under 
Turner today. As Part III explained, the question of causation of harm is one particular 
aspect of the Turner rational basis approach that greatly harms free speech interests but 
that largely could be cured by instantiating into Turner the proof-of-causation approach 
embraced by the Supreme Court in Brown in 2011. That result, however, as Part III 
explained, is not likely to occur. 
                                                
356 See supra subpart II.A.4 (examining Hrdlicka). 
357 See supra subpart II.B.4 (examining Couch). 
358 The exceptions to overly deferential review under Turner described in this Article are found in Hrdlicka 
v. Reniff and Couch v. Jabe described above in subparts II.A.4 and II.B.4, respectively. 
359 See supra notes 81–97 and accompanying text (describing the Eighth Amendment standard supported by 
Justices Thomas and Scalia). 
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APPENDIX 
Below are the names and brief descriptions of some other federal court decisions 
rendered from January 2010 through September 2011 involving the free speech rights of 
inmates but not otherwise discussed in this article. 
 
1. Frazier v. Ortiz, 417 Fed. Appx. 768 (10th Cir. 2011) (involving an inmate’s 
claim of wrongful denial of access to Rolling Stone, Maxim, and Spin magazines, 
and finding no abuse of discretion by a judge who denied the inmate’s motion to 
amend because the inmate failed to clear the burden to avoid summary judgment).  
2. Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14753 (10th Cir. July 20, 
2011) (involving an inmate’s lawsuit against prison officials challenging a ban on 
usage of federal funds to distribute commercially published, sexually explicit 
materials, and holding the claims were moot because the inmate failed to seek 
relief on a system-wide basis rather than against specific individuals at an 
institution where he no longer was incarcerated).  
3. Kaden v. Slykhuis, 651 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2011) (involving denial of inmate 
access to the magazine Shonen Jump due to its allegedly violent content, and 
reversing dismissal of the inmate’s case and remanding it for further consideration 
of the validity of the prison’s regulation as applied to Shonen Jump because the 
inmate’s lawsuit “was dismissed before [prison] officials were required to answer 
the complaint, let alone to advance evidence that might help us decipher whether 
[the prison’s] decision to apply the violent-prison-mail regulation to this 
publication was appropriate, or an exaggerated response to prison concerns”).  
4. Parkhurst v. Lampert, 418 Fed. Appx. 712 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary 
judgment in favor of prison officials who refused to deliver unsolicited and bulk 
copies of an inmate’s newsletter to prisoners in the Wyoming State Penitentiary).  
5. Woods v. Comm’r Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 652 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2011) (involving a 
policy prohibiting inmates from advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials 
from websites and publications that allow persons to advertise for pen-pals, and 
upholding the regulation as reasonably related to the legitimate penological 
objective of preventing inmate fraud). 
6. Stauffer v. Gearhart, No. H-08-1587, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65624 (S.D. Tex. 
July 20, 2011) (rejecting an inmate’s claim of wrongful denial of access to Hot 
Rod, Performance Products, and Jeg’s High Performance magazines because 
they commonly feature sexually explicit material).  
7. Brown v. Gulash, No. 07-cv-370-JPG-PMF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29766 (S.D. 
Ill. Mar. 22, 2011) (rejecting prison officials’ motion for summary judgment on a 
claim alleging they violated an inmate’s First Amendment speech rights by 
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denying access to magazines and books because prison officials failed to offer any 
justification for rejecting them). 
8. Lucas v. Ozmint, No. 9:10-17-CMC-BM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30353 (D. S.C. 
Mar. 22, 2011) (rejecting prison officials’ summary judgment motion regarding 
an inmate’s First Amendment claims because defendants provided no evidence 
that policies used to reject access to Maxim, GQ, and Sports Illustrated magazines 
were related to legitimate penological interests). 
9. Jones v. Golden, No. 5:10CV00068 JMM-BD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42565 
(E.D. Ark. Mar. 9, 2011) (rejecting inmate’s claim that prison officials wrongfully 
denied him access to Angels of Death magazine because it featured gang signs 
and violated a prison policy against delivery of material condoning “criminal 
activity”).  
10. Erler v. Dominguez, No. 2:09-CV-88-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20632 (N.D. 
Ind. Feb. 28, 2011) (involving a claim filed by an inmate alleging prison officials 
violated his First Amendment speech rights by denying him access to a magazine 
because it violated prison policy against delivery of publications containing semi-
nude photographs of women).  
11. De Puente-Hudson v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-01228-OWW-GSA-PC, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16421 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011) (involving a pro se action against 
prison officials for prohibiting and confiscating Maxim, Stuff, and FHM 
magazines, and holding the inmate’s First Amendment rights were not violated by 
the policy because it satisfied the Turner test).  
12. Reynolds v. Rios, No. 1:10-cv-00051-OWW-GBCPC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18588 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (dismissing an inmate’s claim targeting denial of 
access to publications such as Vanity Fair, W, Esquire, and GQ, but granting a 
thirty-day leave to amend his complaint).  
13. Glassman v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-01485-OWW-SKO PC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10075 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011) (rejecting a prisoner’s claim for access to 
magazines including Dungeons and Dragons and The Forgotten Temple of 
Tharizdan because they constituted a threat to prison safety and security).  
14. Mashaney v. Call, No. 09-3105-JTM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137319 (D. Kan. 
Dec. 29, 2010) (rejecting an inmate’s claim that prison officials violated his First 
Amendment rights by denying access to Interview magazine because it contained 
sexually explicit material in violation of a prison policy).  
15. Newsom v. Knight, No. 1:09-cv-1252-JMS-DML, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135513 
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2010) (rejecting an inmate’s claim that prison officials 
wrongly denied him access to Slingshot newspaper under a policy prohibiting 
access to violent materials and dismissing plaintiff’s claim regarding denial of the 
hardcover book Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows because the prison 
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officials against whom the inmate filed the claim had no involvement with 
enforcing the policy).  
16. Davis v. Zavaras, No. 09-cv-00266-REB-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141575 
(D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2010) (involving a claim made by a sex-offender inmate that 
prison officials violated his First Amendment rights by ordering mailroom staff to 
deny him access to magazines such as Playboy, Maxim, National Geographic, 
The Picture Pimp, Garden State Periodicals, Fantasy World, and Manga Woman, 
as well as the books Real Girls and Fresh Girls; and upholding defendants’ 
summary judgment motion because confiscation of the publications was related to 
legitimate penological interests).  
17. Banks v. Ludeman, No. 08-5792 (MJD/JJK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36711 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 4, 2010) (dismissing a sex-offender inmate’s complaint against 
Minnesota Department of Human Services officials for denying him access to 
Christies New York Photographs catalog because it violated prison policy 
prohibiting possession of sexually explicit materials but denying the defendants’ 
summary judgment motions regarding confiscation of the DVD The Adventure of 
Photography: 150 Years of the Photographic Image and the magazine Pacific 
Island Ladies, because the defendants provided no evidence how the materials 
violated prison policy).  
18. Johnson v. Shemonic, No. 10-071-GPM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104446 (S.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s First Amendment claim that prison officials 
wrongfully denied him access to magazines under a policy prohibiting sexually 
explicit material because such denial was rationally related to legitimate 
penological interests).  
19. Givens v. Landers, No. 09-cv-00945-PAB-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95072 
(D. Colo. Aug. 4, 2010) (dismissing an inmate’s complaint alleging wrongful 
denial of access to Curves and Smooth Girl magazines because they contained 
photos of women in minimal clothing, violating a policy prohibiting delivery of 
sexually explicit materials).  
20. Hedgespeth v. Bartow, No. 09-cv-246-slc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76280 (W.D. 
Wis. July 27, 2010) (rejecting an inmate’s First Amendment claims regarding 
access to video games, gaming systems, CDs, and DVDs because of security 
concerns associated with possession and lending of such materials within the 
prison system).  
21. Hunsaker v. Jimerson, No. 08-cv-01479-REB-MJW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
95546 (D. Colo. July 9, 2010) (involving a sex-offender inmate’s claim that 
prison officials wrongfully denied access to Maxim, Sunset, Rolling Stone, 
Newsweek, and the Rocky Mountain News under a prison policy the inmate 
alleged was unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad, and rejecting the officials’ 
motion that the claim be summarily dismissed).  
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22. Gonzalez v. Mullen, No. C 09-00953 CW (PR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55947 
(N.D. Cal. May 14, 2010) (involving an inmate’s claim against prison officials for 
denying him access to R-rated movies but dismissing his complaint because the 
prison did not enforce the policy and thus the policy had no apparent effect on 
him).  
23. Espinosa v. Addams, No. 1:09-cv-00760-DLB PC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46177 
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2010) (involving an inmate’s claim alleging prison officials 
wrongfully denied him access to a Wicca book his family purchased because it 
contained nudity, and dismissing his claim because he alleged no facts indicating 
officials’ violated his First Amendment rights).  
24. Baker v. Holder, No. 06-CV-91-HRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30560 (E.D. Ky. 
Mar. 30, 2010) (holding that a prison policy denying prisoners access to 
magazines that contained sexually explicit material did not violate the prisoner’s 
First Amendment rights). 
